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ABSTRACT
Technology platforms are the new governments, and content moderation is the new law,
or so goes a common refrain. As platforms increasingly turn toward new, automated
mechanisms of enforcing their rules, the apparent power of the private sector seems only to
grow. Yet beneath the surface lies a web of complex relationships between public and private
authorities that call into question whether platforms truly possess such unilateral power. Law
enforcement and police are exerting influence over platform content rules, giving governments
a louder voice in supposedly “private” decisions. At the same time, law enforcement avails
itself of the affordances of social media in detecting, investigating, and preventing crime.
This Article, prepared for a symposium dedicated to Joel Reidenberg’s germinal article
Lex Informatica, untangles the relationship between content moderation and surveillance.
Building on Reidenberg’s fundamental insights regarding the relationships between rules
imposed by legal regimes and those imposed by technological design, the Article first traces
how content moderation rules intersect with law enforcement, including through formal
demands for information, informal relationships between platforms and law enforcement
agencies, and the impact of end-to-end encryption. Second, it critically assesses the degree to
which government involvement in content moderation actually tempers platform power.
Rather than effective oversight and checking of private power, it contends, the emergent
arrangements between platforms and law enforcement institutions foster mutual
embeddedness and the entrenchment of private authority within public governance.
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INTRODUCTION

In September 2020, after a summer of uprisings against police violence, a
series of wildfires broke out in the Northwest. It didn’t take long for rumors
that the fires had been started by antifa activists, or by the Proud Boys, to start
spreading on social media. Soon, vigilantes set up roadblocks, searching for
the responsible parties and, in the process, obstructing traffic and heightening
tensions. Law enforcement agencies, tasked with enforcing evacuation orders,
grew increasingly concerned about viral misinformation making their jobs even
harder. 1
1. Dennis Romero, Facebook to Take Down False Reports of Antifa Arson in Oregon, NBC
NEWS (Sept. 13, 2020, 2:58 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebooktake-down-false-reports-antifa-arson-oregon-n1239966.
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After first working to attach misinformation “warning labels” to the posts,
Facebook ultimately announced that it would delete the posts altogether. 2
Facebook’s action was welcome, but puzzling to some. After a year of epic
failures in addressing misinformation about public health, elections, and social
movements, why did Facebook act so quickly—and so aggressively—in
shutting down misinformation about the Oregon wildfires? This Article
proposes a potential answer: law enforcement’s assertion of its own demands
and needs shaped Facebook’s content moderation rules and affected
Facebook’s response to crisis.
This Article suggests that law enforcement’s impact on content
governance is not sporadic or fleeting. Policing is, instead, a durable influence
on the rules, standards, and technical processes by which platforms govern
their communities. Nor is this influence limited to high profile examples of
unlawful speech, such as terrorism, incitement of violence, or sex trafficking.
In more quotidian contexts, platforms also play a crucial role as intermediaries
in evidence-gathering processes. 3 As police increasingly depend upon digital
evidence in investigating and prosecuting crime, content governance strategies
also shape the kinds of data that are germane to investigations and affect how
law enforcement does its job. 4
This commingling of public and private authority raises conceptual
questions about the nature of content and data governance. While a robust
literature considers how and why platforms have developed “community
standards” by which they govern user behavior in online spaces, the “private”
character of these standards and rules is often taken for granted. 5 Indeed,
platforms are often described as governments in their own right, equally
powerful and sovereign as the states in which they are headquartered. 6 The
structure of intermediary liability law reaffirms this conception of platform
2. Reuters Staff, Facebook Removes Posts Linking Oregon Wildfires to Activist Groups,
REUTERS (Sept. 13, 2020, 3:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wildfiresfacebook-idUSKBN264013.
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See infra Part III.B.
5. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation,
106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2017); NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAWLESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN
OUR DIGITAL LIVES 11 (2019) (“The legal reality is that social media platforms belong to the
companies that create them, and they have almost absolute power over how they are run.”).
6. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 672 (2019); see also
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 122 (2019) (noting that platforms “have worked to position
themselves as both essential partners and competing sovereigns in the quest to instantiate
states of exception algorithmically”).
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governance as “private.” At least under U.S. law (for now), platforms are
largely immune from liability for hosting even unlawful user-generated
content, leading scholars to describe the voluntary mechanisms they enforce
as a category of private regulation adopted without legal obligation.
In fact, however, the purportedly private rules of content moderation
emerge and operate within a political context in which law enforcement acts
as a particularly powerful stakeholder. For example, law enforcement has
encouraged platforms to adopt more stringent rules on certain categories of
harmful content, such as child sexual abuse imagery (CSAM) or violent rap
music in the UK. 7 In Europe, police agencies have formed special “internet
referral units” to report and flag violations of platforms’ content rules for
takedown. 8 Platforms’ private decision-making thus provides a new avenue for
law enforcement to regulate the public sphere. 9 As platform firms turn to
automation and artificial intelligence to scale up their efforts to address
harmful online content, the technical infrastructures of content moderation
increasingly reflect government influence. 10
Just as law enforcement seeks expanded influence over platforms’ private
decision-making, the processes and technical affordances of content
governance also affect and shape law enforcement investigations in more
mundane contexts. Police rely on social media to identify purported gang
members, generate investigative leads, map networks and associations, and
monitor activity by the public. 11 The prevalence of social media as an
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Brian Chang, From Internet Referral Units to International Agreements: Censorship of the
Internet by the UK and EU, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 114, 120–22 (2017); Hannah BlochWehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 72 SMU L. REV. 27,
45–46 (2019).
9. Susan Benesch, But Facebook’s Not a Country: How to Interpret Human Rights Law for
Social Media Companies, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. BULL. 86, 99 (2020) (“Company content
moderation is also used as a means for states to carry out silent and invisible censorship.”); see
also Bloch-Wehba, supra note 8, at 45–46 (distinguishing between legal takedown orders and
the expanded global sweep of takedowns under platforms’ internal terms of service).
10. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 41, 69–70
(2020).
11. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 743–44 (2008) (describing
how law enforcement began to use communications traffic data to map social relationships
and group memberships, and naming these strategies “relational surveillance”); Desmond
Upton Patton, Douglas-Wade Brunton, Andrea Dixon, Reuben Jonathan Miller, Patrick
Leonard & Rose Hackman, Stop and Frisk Online: Theorizing Everyday Racism in Digital Policing in
the Use of Social Media for Identification of Criminal Conduct and Associations, 3 SOCIAL MEDIA +
SOCIETY 1 (2017) (describing the use of social media information in gang databases); Megan
Behrman, When Gangs Go Viral: Using Social Media and Surveillance Cameras to Enhance Gang
Databases, 29 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 315 (2015); Keegan Stephan, Conspiracy: Contemporary Gang
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investigative tool also makes investigations, to some degree, reliant on
platforms’ own decisions about what content-related behaviors to permit or
forbid. For instance, users’ ability to delete posts, photos, videos, emails, and
messages has prompted law enforcement agencies to procure new tools to
scrape and retain user data. 12 Ironically, as platforms have cracked down on
certain types of unlawful content, they have arguably made law enforcement’s
jobs in ferreting out unlawful activity that much more difficult. 13
The chief goal of this Article is to illuminate the close relationship between
platforms and police by examining how content-related decision-making
within private platforms can advance or inhibit law enforcement surveillance
practices. In so doing, I bring together two distinct bodies of scholarship. The
first emphasizes platforms’ roles as private guarantors of free expression and
views government pressures on content-related rules as a toxic form of
“jawboning” or collateral censorship through which the government seeks to
regulate the public sphere indirectly when it could not do so directly. 14 The
second examines how government can compel disclosure or otherwise extract
information about users from social media and the role of internet platforms
in accommodating, facilitating, and resisting those demands. 15 As Joel
Policing and Prosecutions, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1021 (2018) (“The NYPD has admitted that
communicating with the wrong person on social media is enough to get someone placed on a
gang database . . . .”); Sam Biddle, Police Surveilled George Floyd Protests with Help from TwitterAffiliated Startup Dataminr, THE INTERCEPT (July 9, 2020, 8:00 PM), https://theintercept.com/
2020/07/09/twitter-dataminr-police-spy-surveillance-black-lives-matter-protests/; Bill Dries,
Police Documents Show Protest Spreadsheet and Fear of ‘Radical’, MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS (July 31,
2018), https://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2018/jul/31/police-documents-showprotest-spreadsheet-and-fear-of-radicals//print.
12. Kate Knibbs, The Race to Preserve the DC Mob’s Digital Traces, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2021, 5:40
PM), https://www.wired.com/story/archive-social-media-footage-pro-trump/; see infra text
accompanying notes 122–129.
13. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, More Police Admitting That FOSTA/SESTA Has Made It Much
More Difficult to Catch Pimps and Traffickers, TECHDIRT, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20180705/01033440176/more-police-admitting-that-fosta-sesta-has-made-it-much-moredifficult-to-catch-pimps-traffickers.shtml (last visited Mar. 25, 2021).
14. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/
New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2013); Derek E. Bambauer, Against
Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51 (2015); Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled
Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035 (2017).
15. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112
(2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications
of Technosocial Change Special Feature: Cyberlaw, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2010–11); Jonathan Manes,
Online Service Providers and Surveillance Law Transparency, 125 YALE L.J. F. 343 (2015–16); Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018); Rebecca Wexler, Privacy as
Privilege: The Stored Communications Act and Internet Evidence, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2721 (2021).
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Reidenberg suggested in Lex Informatica, these two conceptions address two
siloed visions of the role of platforms in constituting and governing the public
sphere. 16
This Article makes three contributions. First, it complicates existing
narratives about the respective roles of social media platforms and law
enforcement agencies regarding effective policing. Second, the Article maps
how law enforcement both influences and relies upon platform content
governance. Although law enforcement seeks to influence lex informatica, the
substantive, procedural, and technical rules of platforms also shape law
enforcement itself. Finally, the Article examines the implications of this publicprivate cooperation for the law of criminal procedure. Understanding how
(public) law enforcement and (private) platform rules mutually inform and coconstitute each other complicates the existing division in U.S. law between
state and private action. 17
The rest of the Article proceeds in three parts. Part II reviews how
protections from intermediary liability encouraged the development of private
platform governance through technology, even as law enforcement needs
remained a powerful influence on firms. Today, contemporary debates over
changes to intermediary liability rules highlight the risk that new regulations
might promote state censorship laundered through private actors. 18 Even
without legal change, however, recent decisions by payment processors and
social media platforms reflect the continuing influence of law enforcement
even in “private” domains, as Part II.B recounts.
Part III develops the idea that the emergence of online commerce and
communication has fundamentally reshaped law enforcement investigative
practices. Part III further illustrates that the technological affordances of
platforms drive policing’s appetite for more data. 19 And while platforms
sometimes constrain policing through privately developed policy, the
mechanisms of private governance also advance law enforcement strategies. 20
The result is that the technological modalities of governing online content also

16. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554 (1997) (distinguishing between “[t]he treatment of
content” and “the treatment of personal information”).
17. Cf. Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The Constitutional Limits of Private Surveillance, 66 U. KAN.
L. REV. 485, 490 (2018) (arguing that whether surveillance is conducted by state or private
actors may not matter if it “threaten[s] the integrity of social life”).
18. See infra Part II.C.
19. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part III.B.
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have increasing resonance for law enforcement investigations despite their
“private” character. 21
Part IV considers the implications of the increasing enmeshment of private
platforms and law enforcement for the law of criminal procedure. The turn
toward automated modalities of content governance will create new types and
sources of information relevant to new kinds of investigations. 22 Yet more
extensive collaboration between law enforcement and platforms will raise
difficult questions about how best to vindicate important accountability and
transparency values when private firms play an increasingly significant role in
facilitating public functions.
II.

POLICING’S INFLUENCE ON PLATFORMS

People use social media to keep up with their friends and family, watch
music and cooking videos, and consume news and political commentary. But
social media is also home to a slew of unlawful content. For example, YouTube
hosts videos that infringe copyright, 23 Facebook Marketplace features posts
advertising drugs, sex, and guns, 24 and Twitter is home to coded posts
advertising child sexual abuse imagery. 25 Yet under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, none of these sites can be held liable
for hosting content that violates the law, with only a few exceptions. 26 This
Part explores how, in spite of existing protections insulating them from
liability, platforms have developed many formal and informal mechanisms for
advancing law enforcement interests. Although not uniform, these
mechanisms illustrate that platforms frequently accommodate law
21. Id.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See Kristelia García, Monetizing Infringement, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 265, 286 (2020)
(describing how the scale of copyright infringement on YouTube led the platform to develop
Content ID, an automated content screening tool).
24. Parmy Olson & Zusha Elinson, Gun Sellers are Sneaking Onto Facebook’s Booming
Secondhand Marketplace, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2019, 5:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
gun-sellers-are-sneaking-onto-facebooks-booming-secondhand-marketplace-11566315198;
Ananya Bhattacharya, Facebook’s New Marketplace is Already Flooded with Illegal Guns, Drugs, Sex,
and Wildlife, QUARTZ, https://qz.com/799943/facebooks-fb-new-marketplace-is-alreadyflooded-with-illegal-guns-drugs-sex-and-wildlife/ (last visited July 15, 2021).
25. Olivia Solon, Child Sexual Abuse Images and Online Exploitation Surge During Pandemic,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2020, 9:01 PM EST), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
child-sexual-abuse-images-online-exploitation-surge-during-pandemic-n1190506.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Sec. 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 403 (2017)
(describing how Section 230 immunity has been extended to “immunize platforms dedicated
to abuse and others that deliberately host users’ illegal activities”).
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enforcement needs (although, at times, they also resist law enforcement
demands).
A.

INTERMEDIARY PROTECTION AND PRIVATE GOVERNANCE

While Section 230(c)(1) immunizes platforms from liability for most
content posted by users, 27 Section 230(c)(2)’s “Good Samaritan” provision
also protects providers that restrict “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” content. 28 The
Good Samaritan provision explicitly immunizes online platforms that choose
to edit or curate content in ways that would violate the First Amendment if
done by the government itself. 29
The result is that Section 230 ranks “among the most important
protections of free expression in the United States in the digital age.” 30 It also
set the stage for the emergence and growth of what Joel Reidenberg called “lex
informatica.” 31 Section 230’s Good Samaritan provision created breathing
room within which self-regulation and private standard setting became the
norm. 32 Without the obligation to monitor, filter, or block content,
intermediaries nonetheless began to do so, developing both new rules to shape
their communities and new enforcement technologies. 33 The example of spam
filtering is illustrative: facing a flood of unsolicited commercial advertising,

27. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (concluding that depictions
of animal cruelty do not fall into a category of speech that is unprotected by the First
Amendment); FACEBOOK COMMUNITY STANDARDS, Coordinating Harm and Publicizing Crime,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/coordinating_harm_publicizing_crime/
(banning content “depicting, admitting to or promoting[,] [a]cts of physical harm against
animals”); see also Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 68 (2021) (reasoning that Section
230(c)(2) protects online video hosting service from liability when it deletes a user account
that violates its policy against the promotion of conversion therapy).
30. Balkin, supra note 14, at 2313.
31. Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 555; see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1215–16 (1998) (“Private legal ordering thus has the potential to resolve
many, but not all, of the challenges posed by multijurisdictional cyberspace activity.”).
32. Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 583 (“Law may encourage the development of Lex
Informatica by imposing liability on various network actors, and law may provide immunity
or safe harbors for implementation of technical rules.”); see also Klonick, supra note 5, at 1603–
04 (linking private governance to legal immunity).
33. See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 52 (describing the development of spam
filtering).
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platforms developed anti-spam rules, protocols, and software to filter out
unwanted ads. 34
But while protections for intermediaries allowed “private” regulation to
flourish, formal immunity from liability does not equate to immunity from
government pressure. 35 Even with Section 230’s liability shield intact,
government agencies often engage in efforts to coerce, compel, or convince
intermediaries to take down harmful content or provide information about the
users who posted it. 36 These dynamics may transform online intermediaries
into engines of unaccountable private censorship. Scholars of free speech
worry that in controversial cases, the government might pressure online
intermediaries to go along with the state’s own preferences for online speech,
a form of “soft censorship” or “jawboning.” 37
Take the example of drill music, a genre of rap pioneered on Chicago’s
South Side and popular in its own right in the United Kingdom. 38 To earn a
living, drill artists rely on social media to distribute music videos that contain
“morally charged caricatures of themselves,” replete with guns, violent lyrics,
and drugs. 39 But drill music’s violent content and links to offline crime have
also earned it the attention of law enforcement. 40 During a rise in violent crime
34. Id. at 55 (describing how platforms turned to automated technology to scale the fight
against spam but adopted different definitions of prohibited spam activity).
35. Balkin, supra note 14, at 2314 (“What a system of intermediary immunities and safe
harbors does not protect, however, constitutes a system of intermediary liability and, hence,
of potential collateral censorship.”); see also Chris Montgomery, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive
the Internet and the Age of Terrorism?: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
141, 168–78 (2009) (describing how law enforcement has encouraged voluntary action by ISPs
and communications service providers).
36. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 674 (2003) (describing
Pennsylvania law that required internet service providers to remove or block access to child
pornography within five business days); Bambauer, supra note 14, at 67–68 (recounting how,
under pressure from law enforcement institutions, states adopted laws meant to hold
Backpage.com liable for posts submitted by users, knowing that those laws were likely
unenforceable).
37. Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 905 (2012) (describing
process-oriented problems with “soft censorship”); Bambauer, supra note 14, at 61 (defining
“jawboning” as “enforcement through informal channels, where the underlying authority is in
doubt”).
38. Lambros Fatsis, Policing the Beats: The Criminalisation of UK drill and Grime Music by the
London Metropolitan Police, 67 SOCIO. REV. 1300, 1302 (2019); Ben Beaumont-Thomas, Is UK
Drill Music Really Behind London’s Wave of Violent Crime? (Apr. 9, 2018), http://
www.theguardian.com/music/2018/apr/09/uk-drill-music-london-wave-violent-crime.
39. FORREST STUART, BALLAD OF THE BULLET: GANGS, DRILL MUSIC, AND THE
POWER OF ONLINE INFAMY 6 (2020).
40. YouTube Must Crack Down on Videos Pushing Violence & Knife Crime, MAYOR OF
LONDON (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.london.gov.uk//city-hall-blog/youtube-must-crackdown-videos-pushing-violence-knife-crime.
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in London, Cressida Dick, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police,
began to pressure social media platforms to take down UK drill videos, citing
their relationship to knife crime. 41 In response, YouTube began aggressively
taking down drill videos pursuant to police requests and developed special
policies “specifically to help tackle videos related to knife crime in the UK.” 42
YouTube also embraced close relationships with the police, publicizing its
“dedicated process for the police to flag videos directly to [YouTube’s]
teams.” 43 From the police perspective, stemming the dissemination of drill
videos was only one part of a multiprong strategy. Police also obtained a
“criminal behavior order” enjoining five people from “mentioning death or
injury” in their online videos. 44 The Metropolitan Police also announced that
it was indexing and tracking an extensive list of drill videos. 45
Sometimes, however, platforms push back against government demands.
Consider, for example, the infamous “Innocence of Muslims” video, an
Islamophobic “film” that sparked violent protests across the world and
reportedly led to the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. 46 As
violence spread, the White House reportedly called YouTube to ask the firm

41. Met Police Chief Calls on YouTube to Take Down Drill Music to Curb Gang Crime, LBC
(May 18, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.lbc.co.uk/radio/presenters/nick-ferrari/met-policechief-calls-on-youtube-drill-music/.
42. Lizzie Dearden, Police Targeting Drill Music Videos in Controversial Crackdown on Social
Media That ‘Incites Violence’, THE INDEPENDENT (May 29, 2018, 12:04 AM), https://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/drill-music-stabbings-london-youtube-violencepolice-knife-crime-gangs-a8373241.html; Jim Connolly, Home Secretary: ‘Sweep the Net, Take
Down Knife-crime Posts’, BBC NEWS: NEWSBEAT (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/
newsbeat-47211631; Ed Clowes, For British Drill Stars, the Police are Listening Closely, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/11/arts/music/digga-d-drill-music.html
(charting rise in YouTube’s takedown numbers).
43. Dearden, supra note 42.
44. Ladbroke Grove Banned From Making ‘Violent Drill Music’, BBC NEWS (June 15, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-44498231; Lanre Bakare, ‘New Stop and
Search’: Rappers Condemn Police Over Drill Bans, THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2019), http://
www.theguardian.com/music/2019/jun/14/rappers-konan-krept-condemn-policecriminalisation-of-drill (describing how two rappers were sentenced to prison for breaching a
gang injunction prohibiting them from performing violent lyrics).
45. Jim Edwards, YouTube Deleted 130 Rap Videos to Help Police Fight Street Gangs Responsible
for Thousands of Stabbings, BUS. INSIDER (June 29, 2019, 12:52 PM), https://
www.businessinsider.com/uk-drill-rap-videos-banned-by-police-2019–6 (quoting Met police
as saying that their database contained over 2,000 music videos, while they had filed only 154
takedown requests with YouTube).
46. Michael Joseph Gross, The Making of The Innocence of Muslims: Cast Members Discuss the
Film That Set Fire to the Arab World, VANITY FAIR (Dec. 27, 2012), https://
www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/12/making-of-innocence-of-muslims.
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to review whether the video complied with its terms of service. 47 President
Obama told 60 Minutes that while “we believe in the First Amendment,” the
film “is not representative of who we are and our values.” 48 Civil liberties
advocates chafed at the White House’s use of quasi-official channels to
pressure YouTube to take down the offensive but lawful video, and YouTube
ultimately resisted the calls to take the video down for a U.S. audience. 49
These two illustrations demonstrate YouTube’s power to either facilitate
or obstruct law enforcement priorities. In the “Innocence of Muslims” case,
YouTube’s own content-related policies led it to resist the White House’s
encouragement to take down the video. Across the pond, however, YouTube
created new content-related rules at law enforcement’s behest, offering itself
as a vital partner to police. In both cases, YouTube’s decisions were formally
voluntary, free of government coercion. 50
B.

FORMAL INDEPENDENCE, INFORMAL ENTANGLEMENT

Notwithstanding platforms’ status as private actors, government
preferences continue to shape firms’ internal content moderation systems,
rules, and practices in a more general sense. Yet these kinds of pressures rarely
amount to the kind of government coercion extensive enough to amount to a
plausible First Amendment claim. 51 It can be difficult to draw a line between
changes to content-related decisions that occur because of jawboning and
those that occur because of reputational or business risk. 52 Using the examples
of terrorist content and sex work, this subpart shows that firms’ behavior
might be attributed as much to political climate as to unambiguous legal
obligations.
1. Terrorist Content
Platforms have touted their ability to use artificial intelligence, automation,
and hash matching to detect and prevent the dissemination of online terrorist
content, advertising their abilities to proactively remove ISIS and al-Qaeda
47. Josh Gerstein, Activists Troubled by White House Call to YouTube, POLITICO (Sept. 14,
2012, 4:42), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/09/activists-troubledby-white-house-call-to-youtube-135618.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. However, as I have previously argued elsewhere, threats of regulation can also
generate “voluntary” proactive measures by platforms. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 58.
51. See Montgomery, supra note 35, at 172–73.
52. Kreimer, supra note 14, at 50; Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Schiff, CV 20106 (RC), 2021 WL 354174, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2021) (concluding that plaintiffs could not
demonstrate that congressional statements led to private action by social media companies
that lessened traffic to plaintiffs’ website).
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terrorist content. 53 Notwithstanding claims of technical sophistication,
however, critics have observed that platforms continued to allow designated
foreign terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC to
maintain profiles and post content online, long after becoming aware of their
activities. 54 Still, the numerous attempts to hold social media companies liable
for the proliferation of online terrorist content have been unsuccessful. 55
From one perspective, in the absence of liability, social media firms have
allowed themselves to be used as conduits for terrorist speech. 56 At the same
time, however, firms have continued to engage in what Alexander Tsesis calls
“corporate self-policing.” 57 For example, Zoom cancelled a 2020 San
Francisco State University event with Leila Khaled, a Palestinian activist and
member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a designated
foreign terrorist organization. 58 Zoom argued that providing the platform for
the talk would have violated federal laws prohibiting providing material
support to terrorist organizations. 59 Similarly, in 2021, Google reportedly
terminated the account of an activist sharing materials regarding Palestine on
Google Drive, also citing violations of terrorism laws. 60
In many instances, these decisions go above and beyond what the law
appears to require. In numerous cases, courts have held that platforms are not
civilly liable when their services are used by terrorists. 61 While regulators have
pressured platforms to take more proactive steps to address terrorist content,
platforms’ blunt approaches to removing terrorist content also risk over
53. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 59.
54. Citron & Wittes, supra note 26, at 403; Luis Jaime Acosta, Social Networks Clamp Down
on Colombian FARC Dissident Accounts, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2021, 11:40 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/N/us-twitter-colombia-idUSKBN29K2HI.
55. See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018); Gonzalez v. Google, 282 F.
Supp. 3d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Crosby v. Twitter, 303 F. Supp. 3d 564 (E.D. Mich. 2018);
Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).
56. Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 605, 611 (2017–18).
57. Id. at 613.
58. Alice Speri & Sam Biddle, Zoom Censorship of Palestine Seminars Sparks Fight Over
Academic Freedom, THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 14, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2020/
11/14/zoom-censorship-leila-khaled-palestine/.
59. Id.
60. @hotgirlhala, TWITTER (Apr. 22, 2021, 2:41 PM), https://twitter.com/hotgirlhala/
status/1385212069679702020.
61. See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018); Crosby v. Twitter, 303 F.
Supp. 3d 564 (E.D. Mich. 2018), aff’g 921 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2019); Force v. Facebook, 934
F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019); Sinclair for Tucker v. Twitter, Inc., C 17-5710 SBA, 2019 WL 10252752
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019); Clayborn v. Twitter, Inc., 17-CV-06894-LB, 2018 WL 6839754
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2018).
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censorship. 62 At the same time, this focus on Islamic terrorism, and particularly
on ISIS and al-Qaeda, led to a severely under inclusive approach to other
threats. Like many law enforcement agencies, social media companies paid
little attention to problems of White nationalism and White extremism until
after the Christchurch attacks in 2019. 63 Even then, platforms’ mechanisms to
address White nationalism and White supremacy have been haphazard and
incomplete. 64
There are several potential explanations for platforms’ voluntary actions
to address terrorism. Most notable, perhaps, is the adoption of new regulations
in Europe that require platforms to take down terrorist content within an hour,
or else face liability. 65 In the United States, other pressures are in play. The
threat that social media companies may face potential criminal liability under
the material support statutes, as Tsesis and others have urged, may have
encouraged platforms to address terrorism more aggressively. 66 Or perhaps the
burgeoning calls to rethink Section 230’s liability shield have led platforms to
be more proactive, even in the absence of regulatory change. But government
interests also provide powerful motivation for businesses to address harmful
online content even when firms face no legal obligation to do so. Firms’
62. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUN., SYRIAN ARCHIVE & WITNESS, Caught in the Net: The
Impact of Extremist Speech Regulations on Human Rights Content (2019), https://syrianarchive.org/
en/lost-found/impact-extremist-human-rights#content-moderation-and-extremist-content
(last visited Aug. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Caught in the Net] (describing how reliance on automated
tools to block and delete “terrorist content” also suppress human rights reporting, journalism,
and other socially valuable posts).
63. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 60; Amna Akbar, Policing Radicalization, 3 UC IRVINE
L. REV. 809, 827 (2013) (describing how indicators of Muslim religious observance were
transmuted into signals of “radicalization”).
64. See, e.g., Alex Kaplan, YouTube Removed Some Channels Affiliated with White Nationalism—
But Not All, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA, https://www.mediamatters.org/whitenationalism/youtube-removed-some-channels-affiliated-white-nationalism-not-all (last visited
June 22, 2021); Julia Carrie Wong, White Nationalists are Openly Operating on Facebook. The company
Won’t Act, THE GUARDIAN (Nov 21, 2019, 11:00 GMT), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/nov/21/facebook-white-nationalists-ban-vdare-red-ice.
65. Regulation 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 29,
2021, On Addressing The Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online (“TERREG”), annex,
2021 O.J. (L 172). In prior work, I have explored how platforms reacted to the emergence of
new obligations in Europe, which have since been codified in the TERREG. See Bloch-Wehba,
supra note 8, at 43–48 (detailing the evolution of European rules and platform responses on
terrorist content).
66. Tsesis, supra note 56, at 625–26 (arguing that the material-support statute could
support charges against recalcitrant social media service providers); Benjamin Wittes & Zoe
Bedell, Tweeting Terrorists, Part I: Don’t Look Now but a Lot of Terrorist Groups are Using Twitter,
LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2016, 5:05 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-idont-look-now-lot-terrorist-groups-are-using-twitter.
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takedown priorities appeared to align with the government’s law enforcement
interests: in the context of a now decades-long war on (Islamic) terror,
platforms likewise prioritized takedowns of ISIS and al-Qaeda content. 67
2. Sex Work
The experience of adult service businesses offers another illustration. In
2013, the Department of Justice initiated what it called “Operation Choke
Point,” a program meant to encourage financial institutions to take a more
active role in curtailing fraudulent businesses’ access to the banking system. 68
Critics of the program soon began to worry that banks were also cutting off
legitimate businesses that they simply found distasteful, like pornographers,
gun dealers, and payday lenders. 69 Although an audit later found that the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had not wrongly pressured
banks to drop “high-risk” clients, it acknowledged that the agency’s regulatory
activities “created a perception among some bank executives. . .that the FDIC
discouraged institutions” from pursuing or maintaining business relationships
with high-risk merchants. 70 In 2017, the Trump administration announced that
it would put a stop to Operation Choke Point. 71
Even in the absence of any legal requirements, many banks and payment
processors have chosen to avoid providing services to adult businesses,
perhaps because of social pressure or perceptions of other business risks. 72
However, although online payment processors have no legal obligation to deny
service to “high-risk” adult services clients, they nevertheless continue to keep
67. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 76–77; Caroline Mala Corbin, Terrorists are Always
Muslim but Never White: At the Intersection of Critical Race Theory and Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 455, 458–60 (2017) (describing how popular culture, media narratives, and government
priorities link “terrorism” to Muslim identity).
68. Richard P. Eckman, Richard J. Zack, Christina O. Hud, Jonathan N. Ledsky & Scott
J. Helfand, Update on the Short-Term Lending Industry: Government Investigations and Enforcement
Actions, 70 BUS. LAW. 657 (2014–2015).
69. Elizabeth Nolan Brown, DOJ’s ‘Operation Choke Point’ may be Root of Porn Star Bank
Account Closings, REASON.COM (Apr 29, 2014, 8:40 PM), https://reason.com/2014/04/28/
doj-operation-chokepoint-and-porn-stars/.
70. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., The FDIC’s Role in Operation
Choke Point and Supervisory Approach to Institutions that Conducted Business with Merchants Associated
with High-Risk Activities, at 11 (2015), https://www.fdicoig.gov/publications/fdics-roleoperation-choke-point-and-supervisory-approach-institutions-conducted (last visited Dec. 29,
2021).
71. Victoria Guida, Justice Department to End Obama-era ‘Operation Choke Point’, POLITICO
(Aug. 17, 2017, 10:41 PM), https://politi.co/2lObBHh.
72. See E. Christopher Johnson, Jr., The Important Role for Socially Responsible Businesses in the
Fight Against Human Trafficking and Child Labor in Supply Chains, BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Jan. 22,
2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/01/
02_johnson/.
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adult services providers at arm’s length, reflecting the perception of legal or
business risk caused by providing such services to “high-risk” clients. 73 And
payment processors are powerful intermediaries, critical to “people’s practical
ability to speak”—and in this case, to post photos and videos or to maintain
an online presence at all. 74
New intermediary obligations have heightened the sense that businesses
must do more to address adult content. In 2018, Congress enacted the Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), a statute
designed to promote platform accountability for sex trafficking. 75 As Eric
Goldman has written, FOSTA responded to an apparent accountability gap
that had allowed Backpage, a website primarily used for commercial sex
advertising, to profit from advertisements of trafficking victims. 76 FOSTA
expanded federal criminal liability for sex trafficking and for intentionally
promoting or facilitating prostitution through interactive computer services. 77
Yet recent reporting suggests that FOSTA has hardly changed prosecutors’
ability to charge and convict sex traffickers. A 2021 Government
Accountability Office report indicates that, in the past three years, prosecutors
had only brought one case under FOSTA’s criminal provision. 78 In addition,
as of June 2021, civil damages have never been awarded under FOSTA. 79
Despite its apparently sparse impact on criminal and civil liability, FOSTA
clearly discouraged online platforms from hosting sexual content. In the wake
of FOSTA’s passage, as Goldman recounts, several online service providers
determined that they could no longer bear the risk of hosting any adult content
at all. In 2018, online marketplace Craigslist stopped hosting personal ads
entirely, citing the risk of criminal liability under FOSTA if adult content was
73. Sarah Manavis, The PayPal ASMR banning Shows Us that Tech Companies Don’t
Understand Their Users, NEWSTATESMAN (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.newstatesman.com/
science-tech/technology/2018/09/paypal-asmr-ban-youtube-monetise-patreon (describing
broad application of PayPal’s sexual content policy); Margot Cleveland, How Mastercard’s Rules
Could be Used to Ban Conservatives from Banking, FEDERALIST (Ap. 19, 2021), https://
thefederalist.com/2021/04/19/how-mastercards-rules-against-child-pornographers-couldbe-used-to-ban-conservatives-from-banking/.
74. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2014–15 (2018).
75. See Aja Romano, A new law Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of the
Internet as we Know It, VOX (updated July 2, 2018, 1:08 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/
culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-internet-freedom.
76. Eric Goldman, The Complicated Story of Fosta and Section 230, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
279, 281 (2018).
77. Id. at 284; 18 U.S.C. § 2421A.
78. Sex Trafficking: Online Platforms and Federal Prosecutions 25–26, Gov’t Accountability
Office, GAO-21-385 (June 21, 2021), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-385.
79. Id.
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posted. 80 Even OnlyFans, the pay-per-view website known for risqué content,
has a strict policy against escorts that has dramatically affected the livelihoods
of sex workers. 81 While OnlyFans hosts adult content by amateurs and
celebrities, sex workers report being shunned by the platform, perhaps because
of its assessment of the risk of liability under FOSTA. 82 More broadly, sex
workers have reported that FOSTA’s enactment has “increased their exposure
to violence and left those who rely on sex work as their primary form of
income without many of the tools they had used to keep themselves safe.” 83
Broadly speaking, then, both the examples of terrorist content and sex
work illustrate that, even without an obvious enforcement mechanism, laws
can encourage platforms to take aggressive private action against certain forms
of speech, in alignment with government’s own priorities. Some scholars might
view this as a form of coercion or “jawboning,” as Derek Bambauer and others
have argued. 84 But others might describe platforms’ actions here as the result
of a more subtle form of government influence rather than a clear result of
ham-fisted proxy censorship. 85 And when private incentives align with public
policy, private governance provides a powerful new mechanism by which
government can obtain its desired results without costly inconveniences such
as accountability or oversight.
80. Merrit Kennedy, Craigslist Shuts Down Personals Section After Congress Passes Bill on
Trafficking, NPR (Mar. 23, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/
03/23/596460672/craigslist-shuts-down-personals-section-after-congress-passes-bill-ontraffickin; see also Heidi Tripp, All Sex Workers Deserve Protection: How FOSTA/SESTA Overlooks
Consensual Sex Workers in an Attempt to Protect Sex Trafficking Victims, 124 PENN. ST. L. REV. 219
(2019) (“[M]any ISPs completely shut down certain services on their websites or began overcensoring content beyond what was necessary to comply with FOSTA/SESTA.”).
81. Shae Ashbury, How OnlyFans Steals from Sex Workers and Fans, (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.shae-ashbury.com/shae-ashburys-blog/2019/8/13/how-onlyfans-steals-fromsex-workers; Mark Serrels, Thanks to US laws, Sex Workers are Fighting to Stay Online, CNET
(Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.cnet.com/features/thanks-to-us-laws-sex-workers-are-fightingto-stay-online/.
82. Natalie Jarvey, How OnlyFans Has Become Hollywood’s Risque Pandemic Side Hustle,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 11, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/
how-onlyfans-has-become-hollywoods-risque-pandemic-side-hustle; see also Alexis Okeowo,
The Fragile Existence of Sex Workers During the Pandemic, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2021), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-fragile-existence-of-sex-workers-during-thepandemic (describing how sex workers began to post on OnlyFans after SESTA-FOSTA);
Serrels, supra note 81.
83. Danielle Blunt & Ariel Wolf, Erased: The Impact of FOSTA-SESTA & the Removal of
Backpage, HACKING//HUSTLING 1 (2020), https://hackinghustling.org/erased-the-impact-offosta-sesta-2020/.
84. See Bambauer, supra note 37, at 891–99, 943.
85. See, e.g., Janice Nadler, Expressive Law, Social Norms, and Social Groups, 42 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 60, 64 (2017).
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NEW INCENTIVES FOR PLATFORMS?

At one level, platforms have seemed eager to demonstrate their willingness
and capacity to carry out government priorities through private policing. Yet
governments (particularly outside of the United States) have also struggled to
incentivize platforms to address unlawful content more aggressively. In the
aftermath of the March 2019 massacre at two Christchurch mosques,
governments proposed and adopted new legislation imposing penalties on
online platforms that fail to remove unlawful content. 86
Both law enforcement and platforms see the potential for artificial
intelligence and other automated techniques to enhance compliance with these
measures and speed up takedowns. In Australia, for example, the law now
imposes criminal penalties on providers of online services that do not remove
“abhorrent violent material” “expeditiously.” 87 In Germany, the Network
Enforcement Act of 2018 similarly requires platforms to quickly remove
unlawful content, sometimes within 24 hours, or pay large fines. 88 The
European Union recently finalized its regulation on terrorist content online,
which will not only require platforms to take down terrorist content more
quickly, but also require them to adopt more proactive measures to prevent
the spread of terrorist content in the first place. 89
These kinds of pressures have led free speech advocates and scholars to
see in government regulatory proposals the clear threat of proxy censorship.
The dominant accounts of law enforcement interests in this space describe
governments as seeking more extensive takedowns, more limits on speech, and
more aggressive enforcement of private and public rules, while platforms resist
the imposition of these and similar obligations. 90 Faced with platforms’
independence and immunity from liability, governments seek to require them
to behave more aggressively in filtering out unlawful content, ideally through
adopting new technologies of decision-making.

86. Evelyn Douek, Australia’s New Social Media Law is a Mess, LAWFARE (Apr. 10, 2019,
8:28 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/australias-new-social-media-law-mess.
87. Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 (Cth)
§ 474.34 (Austl.).
88. Evelyn Douek, Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and Fake News Takes
Effect, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-boldgambit-prevent-online-hate-crimes-and-fake-news-takes-effect.
89. Regulation 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 29,
2021, On Addressing The Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online (“TERREG”), annex,
2021 O.J. (L 172).
90. See generally Evelyn Douek, Australia’s “Abhorrent Violent Material” Law: Shouting “Nerd
Harder” and Drowning Out Speech, 94 AUSTL. L. REV. 41 (2020).
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Yet powerful interests also cut in the opposite direction, encouraging
platforms to keep unlawful content online as a form of intelligence for law
enforcement to mine. The enactment of FOSTA has reportedly made it much
more difficult for law enforcement to investigate and detect sex trafficking
victims and perpetrators. 91 Similarly, mechanisms for removing terrorist
content have diminished the availability of human rights reporting online. 92 By
contrast, law enforcement has a strong interest in maintaining access to social
media’s trove of online evidence. The more aggressively social media platforms
enforce their private rules, whether through automated technology or through
manual review, the harder it becomes for law enforcement to conduct this kind
of surveillance. 93
III.

PLATFORMS’ INFLUENCE ON POLICING

The communicative and data-generating affordances of online platforms
change user behavior and create legal challenges. 94 In turn, they also drive
investigative strategy. 95 In the previous Part, I demonstrated that law
enforcement sometimes seeks to control or influence the affordances of social
media platforms, especially when it comes to dangerous or violent speech. But
as this Part shows, the content-related decision-making of platforms also
benefits law enforcement, creating new sources of information with new
affordances for investigating online speech. As a result, police increasingly
depend upon purportedly private content moderation rules, strategies, and
techniques, and platforms have a growing role in facilitating law enforcement
surveillance. The aim here is to complicate what has become a binary
distinction between platform and government and illustrate the mutual
entanglements of the two.

91. See Appellant’s Br. at 54, Woodhull v. DOJ, No. 18-5298 (D.C. Cir. filed Feb. 13,
2019); Masnick, supra note 13.
92. Caught in the Net, supra note 62.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 110–111.
94. For example, the ability to upload user-generated content to YouTube has facilitated
widespread copyright infringement. García, supra note 23, at 285–86. Surprisingly,
rightsholders have sometimes encouraged infringement because they benefit from the free
publicity and “Internet buzz.” Id. at 298–99.
95. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 476, 482 (2011) (describing how “changing technology” and “social practice” might
impel courts to respond by ratcheting up or down the rules that constrain police power).
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SHAPING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGH TECHNOLOGY

It is widely appreciated that private governance plays an increasing role in
state policy. 96 As Jack Balkin has observed, the growing capacity of internet
firms to surveil and control content has also made them “more valuable
targets” for regulation. 97 Perhaps less appreciated, however, is the degree to
which the affordances of networked technologies increasingly shape law
enforcement practices themselves. Design choices dictate what information is
available to law enforcement—and thus what information law enforcement
can demand and use in investigative contexts. 98 Law enforcement is engaged
in a form of what Marion Fourcade and Jeffrey Gordon call “dataist
statecraft,” in which the availability of data minted by both public and private
actors drives policy. 99
1. Compelled Disclosure
Historically, many of the fights about law enforcement access to user
information have been about compelled disclosure of customer records and
communications. 100 The law of compelled disclosure governs the standards by
which law enforcement can obtain access to different categories of user
information in the possession of firms. For example, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) imposes a warrant requirement for
communications that have been stored in an electronic communications
system for 180 days or less. 101 If communications have been stored for greater
than 180 days, then the government can seek access using a subpoena, court
order, or a search warrant, accompanied by different indicia of suspicion and
different notice obligations. 102 This legal structure has generated numerous
96. Balkin, supra note 74, at 2028 (“[N]ew-school speech regulation depends on the
expansion and promulgation of private governance.”); Robert Gorwa, The Platform Governance
Triangle: Conceptualising the Informal Regulation of Online Content, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 7
(2019) (“[I]nformal regulatory arrangements have formed a key tool through which
governance stakeholders—especially EU governments—have sought to shape the behaviour
of firms on content issues.”).
97. Balkin, supra note 74, at 2020.
98. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Structural Sensor Surveillance, 106 IOWA L. REV. 47, 54
(2020) (“[D]esign choices can directly impact the usefulness of the data collected.”).
99. Marion Fourcade & Jeffrey Gordon, Learning Like a State: Statecraft in the Digital Age,
1 J. L. & POL. ECON. 78, 78 (2020).
100. See generally Kerr, supra note 15, at 1209–12 (describing how ambiguities in the Fourth
Amendment’s application to the Internet fostered legal uncertainty about compelled disclosure
of user communications); see also In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 29
N.Y.3d 231 (2017).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Exposing Secret Searches: A First
Amendment Right of Access to Electronic Surveillance Orders, 93 WASH. L. REV. 145, 160 (2018)
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legal battles regarding whether disclosure of a range of information—including
historic cell site location data, web browsing histories, and the contents of
emails—implicates the Fourth Amendment’s definition of a search or
seizure. 103
Focusing on the appropriate standard for defining a government search,
though, threatens to miss the degree to which the availability of networked
technologies itself drives law enforcement strategy. Digital searches and
seizures have vastly grown in number, reflecting the increased relevance of
digital communications in investigations, the growing scale of networked
technology applications and services, and the proliferation of different forms
of information. 104 As the number of requests for user information has
increased, the role of electronic communications service providers in
facilitating, obstructing, and enabling surveillance has also grown apace. 105
Providers such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft have large in-house
compliance teams in order to process a growing number of law enforcement
requests for customer data. 106
Networked technologies are not only driving an increase in the degree of
law enforcement surveillance and control; they are also fundamentally
transforming the work of law enforcement. Consider the surveillance of cell
site location information. In the last decade, significant ink has been spilled
regarding law enforcement’s acquisition of cell phone location information
through real-time tracking, historic location data, cell tower dumps, cell site
simulators, and data purchases. 107 In 2018, the Supreme Court decided in
(describing the different notice provisions for different forms of legal process to compel
disclosure of customer records and communications).
103. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (holding that a disclosure of
a week of cell site location information is a search); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500,
511 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that acquiring IP addresses of websites user visited is not a search);
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a disclosure of email
contents is a search).
104. Rozenshtein, supra note 15, at 109 (arguing that digital intermediaries are “more
central than ever to government surveillance”).
105. See id. at 114; Manes, supra note 15, at 348.
106. See, e.g., Facebook Transparency Report, https://transparency.facebook.com/
government-data-requests/country/US (last visited June 21, 2021) (documenting a rise in the
number of requests from 11,000 in the first half of 2013 to over 61,000 in the first half of
2020); Google Transparency Report, https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview
(last visited July 15, 2021) (documenting a rise in the number of requests from 25,000 in the
first half of 2013 to over 100,000 in the first half of 2020).
107. Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use of Cell Tower
Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 UNIV. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2013); Stephen Wm. Smith,
Gagged, Sealed & Delivered: Reforming ECPA’s Secret Docket, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 601 (2012);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF.
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Carpenter v. United States that obtaining over six days of historical cell site
location from a cell phone service provider constitutes a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. 108 However, the Carpenter Court expressly declined to
decide whether cell tower dumps, which collect all the phone numbers that
connected to a given cell tower during a given time period, held the same
Fourth Amendment implications. 109 Soon afterward, law enforcement began
to seek so-called geofence or reverse location information—information
pertaining to every user in a given geographical radius during a given time
period—from Google. 110 Google’s location tracking—infamously difficult to
turn off or opt out of—becomes the new equivalent of the cell tower. 111
Networked technologies, by design, collect and retain information from large
numbers of users, in turn driving law enforcement to seek more data from
these sources. 112
Likewise, the emergence of the so-called Internet of Things and
omnipresent embedded sensors are equally responsible for novel
transformations in investigative strategy. 113 Law enforcement can now acquire
data from connected speakers, fitness trackers, doorbell cameras, and smart
streetlights. 114 As a result, consumer technology may drive not only selfL. REV. 805 (2016); Byron Tau, House Investigating Company Selling Phone Location Data to
Government Agencies, WALL ST. J: POLITICS (June 24, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/house-investigating-company-selling-phone-location-data-to-government-agencies11593026382.
108. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
109. Id. at 2220; see also Owsley, supra note 107, at 16–17 (arguing that cell tower dumps
are more intrusive than simple pen registers).
110. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location, 497 F. Supp. 3d
345 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
111. Ryan Nakashima, Google Tracks Your Movements, Like it or Not, AP NEWS (Aug. 14,
2018), https://apnews.com/article/north-america-science-technology-business-ap-top-news828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb.
112. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[T]he retrospective quality of the data here
gives police access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.”).
113. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 357, 364–65
(2019).
114. Kayla Epstein, Police Think Amazon’s Alexa may have Information on a Fatal Stabbing Case,
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/02/
police-think-amazons-alexa-may-have-information-fatal-stabbing-case/; Christine Hauser,
Police Use Fitbit Data to Charge 90-Year-Old Man in Stepdaughter’s Killing, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/us/fitbit-murder-arrest.html; John Herrman,
Who’s Watching Your Porch?, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/
19/style/ring-video-doorbell-home-security.html; Jesse Marx, Police Used Smart Streetlight
Footage to Investigate Protesters, VOICE SAN DIEGO (June 29, 2020), https://
www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/police-used-smart-streetlight-footage-toinvestigate-protesters/.
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tracking, but law enforcement tracking as well. 115 As discussed in Part IV,
networked, sensory technologies do not just create goldmines of information
for law enforcement, but also fundamentally alter the legal mechanisms
through which policing can be made transparent and accountable to the public.
2. “Open Source” Investigations
The growing role of compelled disclosure in law enforcement
investigations illustrates the centrality of networked technology as a
mechanism of surveillance, but it is just the tip of the iceberg. Although law
enforcement can influence platform rules and practices through either
takedown requirements (as in Part II) or compelled disclosure requirements
(as in Part III.A), social media can also influence law enforcement by serving
as a ready source of open-source information and evidence.
For instance, law enforcement regularly monitors public social media
activity in both targeted investigations and as a source of dragnet
intelligence. 116 As advocates at the Brennan Center have explained, social
media surveillance often occurs when officers “view[] publicly available posts
by searching for an individual, group, hashtag, or another search vector.” 117
The extent, scope, and manner in which these results might be displayed
depends on the affordances of the platform at issue. For example, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security has monitored Black Lives Matter groups
and events using Twitter hashtags and location information. 118
Law enforcement has also used surveillance services such as Geofeedia,
Snaptrends, and others to access social media data in an automated fashion. 119
115. GINA NEFF & DAWN NAFUS, SELF-TRACKING 178 (Mass. Inst. Tech., 2016)
(describing the potential legal questions around self-tracking data).
116. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Private Eyes, They’re Watching You: Law Enforcement’s
Monitoring of Social Media, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 997, 999–1000 (2019); Rachel Levinson-Waldman,
Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Challenges, 61 HOW. L.J. 523,
541–42 (2018); see also Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1053 (2016) (noting that “generalized collection” can lead to targeted
surveillance).
117. Rachel Levinson-Waldman & Ángel Díaz, How to Reform Police Monitoring of Social
Media, BROOKINGS (July 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-to-reformpolice-monitoring-of-social-media/.
118. George Joseph, Exclusive: Feds Regularly Monitored Black Lives Matter Since Ferguson, THE
INTERCEPT (July 24, 2015, 11:50 AM), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/24/documentsshow-department-homeland-security-monitoring-black-lives-matter-since-ferguson/.
119. Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance Product
Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU: N. CAL. (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/
blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillance-product-marketedtarget; see also Ryan Devereaux, Homeland Security Used a Private Intelligence Firm to Monitor Family
Separation Protests, THE INTERCEPT (Apr. 19, 2019, 8:25 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/
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Social media surveillance can allow law enforcement agencies to assess social
media information for potential risks and threats and map connections
between investigative targets and other subjects. 120 On the other hand, police
do not always recognize the gravity of online threats or “chatter.” On January
5, 2021, Dataminr reached out to police at the U.S. Capitol to notify them of
an uptick in chatter regarding the upcoming riots, but law enforcement
reportedly took no preparatory action. 121
To some extent, the emergence of third-party social media surveillance
tools like Dataminr and Geofeedia is a direct response to platform firms’ user
affordances and content policies. In April 2021, the New York Police
Department (NYPD) published a draft “impact and use policy” for public
comment on NYPD’s social media surveillance systems. 122 The policy stressed
that NYPD only accesses “publicly available information, or information that
is viewable as a result of user privacy settings or practices.” However, the
policy also explained that third party surveillance tools help to fill critical
investigative gaps that result when users or platforms delete content relevant
to an investigation. 123
04/29/family-separation-protests-surveillance/; Colin Daileda, Twitter Cuts Ties with Another
Social Media Surveillance Company, MASHABLE, (Oct. 20, 2016) https://mashable.com/article/
twitter-social-media-surveillance-snaptrends; Colin Daileda, Geofeedia isn’t the Only Social Media
Surveillance Company Giving Data to Police, MASHABLE, (Oct. 12, 2016) https://mashable.com/
article/geofeedia-social-media-surveillance-police.
120. JOHN HOLLYWOOD, MICHAEL JOHN DEVRIES VERMEER, DULANI WOODS, SEAN
GOODISON & BRIAN JACKSON, USING SOCIAL MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS IN
LAW ENFORCEMENT: CREATING A RESEARCH AGENDA, INCLUDING BUSINESS CASES,
PROTECTIONS, AND TECHNOLOGY NEEDS 8–9 (Rand Corporation, 2018) (describing social
media monitoring for “worrisome activity” and in order to identify individuals “at high risk of
being involved in violence”).
121. Zachary Cohen & Whitney Wild, Internal Emails Reveal Capitol Security Officials Dismissed
Warnings About Troubling Social Media Posts Before January 6 Riot, CNN (Apr. 28, 2021, 6:16 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/28/politics/capitol-security-emails-social-media-riot/
index.html.
122. Police Department City Of New York, Social Network Analysis Tools: Impact and Use
Policy
(Apr.
11,
2021),
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/
public_information/post-final/social-network-analysis-tools-nypd-impact-and-use-policy_
4.9.21_final.pdf. The policy was published pursuant to the Public Oversight of Surveillance
Technology Act, a law enforcement reform bill that requires the New York Police Department
to publish reports about its “surveillance technology.”; Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing:
Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 955 (2021).
123. POLICE DEP’T N.Y.C., Social Network Analysis Tools: Impact and Use Policy 3 (Apr. 11,
2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/post-final/
social-network-analysis-tools-nypd-impact-and-use-policy_4.9.21_final.pdf. (“NYPD may
miss information critical to investigations because users can easily remove information posted
on social media and social media platforms routinely delete content and deactivate accounts
for violations of terms of service. Accordingly, social network analysis tools allow the NYPD
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In addition to dragnet surveillance of events and people of interest, law
enforcement uses social media in more targeted ways, often in contexts in
which police rely upon undercover operations and confidential informants. 124
For instance, local police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have
reportedly used undercover social media accounts to surveil groups and
individuals and to develop probable cause to arrest suspected lawbreakers. 125
Similarly, law enforcement routinely uses fake social media accounts to engage
in investigations. 126 For example, sex trafficking investigators often create fake
social media accounts to “befriend, identify, and monitor people suspected of
engaging in criminal activities, as well as those who are presumed to be
victims.” 127 Although creating a fake social media account often violates a
platform’s terms of service and other content-related rules, this practice
appears prevalent.
3. Deputizing Users
The public-facing character of social media itself can feed into law
enforcement strategies. Although law enforcement frequently monitors social
media content and demands access to the wealth of data that online firms
collect and retain, police also engage with users much as other ordinary users

to retain information on social networking platforms relevant to investigations and alert
investigators to new activity on queried social media accounts.”).
124. See Cyrus Farivar & Olivia Solon, FBI Trawled Facebook to Arrest Protestors for Inciting
Riots, Court Records Show, NBC NEWS (June 19, 2020, 1:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
tech/social-media/federal-agents-monitored-facebook-arrest-protesters-inciting-riots-courtrecords-n1231531 (describing FBI’s use of social media to “infiltrate activist groups”).
125. Betsy Woodruff Swan, Feds Comb Facebook to Hunt down Alleged Rioters and Looters,
POLITICO (June 12, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/12/
facebook-riot-loot-justice-department-314567.
126. See, e.g., Dave Maass, Facebook Warns Memphis Police: No More Fake “Bob Smith”
Accounts, ELECTR. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/
09/facebook-warns-memphis-police-no-more-fake-bob-smith-accounts; Dave Maass, Four
Steps Facebook Should Take to Counter Police Sock Puppets, ELECTR. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 14,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/facebook-must-take-these-four-stepscounter-police-sock-puppets; Jon Schuppe, Undercover Cops Break Facebook Rules to Track
Protestors, Ensnare Criminals, NBC NEWS, (Oct. 5, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/undercover-cops-break-facebook-rules-track-protestersensnare-criminals-n916796; Tami Abdollah, U.S. Plan to Use Fake Social Media Profiles for
Surveillance is Against Facebook Rules, PBS (Sept. 3, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/u-s-plan-to-use-fake-social-media-profiles-for-surveillance-is-againstfacebook-rules.
127. JENNIFER MUSTO, CONTROL AND PROTECT: COLLABORATION, CARCERAL
PROTECTION, AND DOMESTIC SEX TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 57–58 (1st ed.
2016).
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do. 128 And, of course, law enforcement uses social media to disseminate
routine information to a mass audience. 129
Law enforcement also relies on social media to generate tips and
investigative leads. For instance, police sometimes post videos to social media
to solicit the public’s help in identifying a suspect. 130 This form of
crowdsourced public assistance can be crucial for investigating crimes but
raises complex questions about online vigilantism, anonymity, and
accountability. In the wake of the January 6 putsch at the U.S. Capitol, the FBI
called for “the public’s assistance in identifying individuals who made unlawful
entry into the U.S. Capitol building and committed various other alleged
criminal violations.” 131 Though the vast majority of the insurrectionists walked
away from the scene at the Capitol, social media users, private investigators,
and the press identified dozens of individuals who were later charged. 132 This
is not the first time in which a group of self-appointed internet users have tried
to identify and hold accountable lawbreakers. In 2017, after the Unite the Right
Rally in Charlottesville, online sleuths identified and outed, or “doxxed,”
several right-wing and White supremacist protestors. 133 But online vigilantes
sometimes identify the wrong people, leading to harassment of innocent
128. See Levinson-Waldman, Private Eyes, supra note 116, at 999 (“[I]f a targeted user has
a public Twitter account, police can go on the site to check the user’s recent posts and
interactions with other users without needing any special third-party software.”).
129. Benesch, supra note 9, at 93 (“The very functions of routine governance are also
carried out, increasingly, on social media platforms.”); see also Knight First Amendment Inst.
at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 235–36 (2019) (describing how President Trump
used his Twitter account “as an important tool of governance and executive outreach”).
130. Aggravated Assault 1 South Broad St. Dc 21 06 015773, YOUTUBE (May 6, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FCeCu8WT3es; Severe Injury Hit and Run Traffic Collision
in Northeast Area NR21122wc, YOUTUBE (May 5, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=zNoDjrw5W-M.
131. FBI, U.S. Capitol Violence, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/capitol-violence (last visited
June 21, 2021); see also FBI Washington Field (@FBIWFO), TWITTER https://twitter.com/
FBIWFO/status/1347407275300954112 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
132. Jaclyn Peiser, Internet Detectives are Identifying Scores of Pro-Trump Rioters at the Capitol.
Some have Already been Fired., WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021, 6:54 AM), https://
Sara
www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/01/08/capitol-rioters-fired-doxed-online/;
Morrison, The Capitol Rioters Put Themselves All Over Social Media. Now they’re Getting Arrested.,
https://www.vox.com/recode/22218963/capitol-photos-legal-charges-fbi-policeVOX,
facebook-twitter (last updated: Jan 19, 2021, 6:52 PM); Greg Myre, How Online Sleuths Identified
Rioters at the Capitol, NPR (Jan. 11, 2021, 9:45 AM) https://www.npr.org/2021/01/11/
955513539/how-online-sleuths-identified-rioters-at-the-capitol.
133. Vegas Tenold, To Doxx a Racist: How a Dead White Supremacist Sparked the Debate About
the Tactics Used Against the Extreme Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 26, 2018), https://
newrepublic.com/article/150159/doxx-racist; Emma Grey Ellis, Whatever Your Side, Doxing is
a Perilous Form of Justice—Even When it’s Outing Nazis, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://
www.wired.com/story/doxing-charlottesville/.
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individuals. For example, in 2013, users of the subreddit Find Boston Bombers
misidentified several people as suspects in the Boston Marathon attack. 134
Scholars such as Mary Anne Franks and Danielle Citron have warned that
doxing can be part of a campaign of online harassment and abuse, with
particularly devastating results for women. 135 But unlike these earlier episodes,
the hundreds of Capitol putsch arrests and prosecutions appear to rely heavily
on identifications made using information gleaned from social media, whether
crowdsourced or obtained directly from platforms. 136 Indeed, in light of major
social media platforms’ decisions to take down much of the evidence related
to the Capitol putsch, crowdsourcing may have been particularly essential to
identifying individuals. 137
The public also uses social media to alert law enforcement to suspicious
activity in more mundane settings. Consider Nextdoor, a social media platform
designed for “neighbors” to exchange information with each other. 138 It is a
unique surveillance tool because it facilitates voluntary, private surveillance by
those who choose to join the platform. 139 As Sam Levin has documented,
White Nextdoor users have deployed the platform to report unsubstantiated
claims of suspicious activity and to organize noise complaints against Black
134. Dave Lee, Boston Bombing: How Internet Detectives Got it Very Wrong, BBC NEWS:
TECHNOLOGY (Apr. 19, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22214511.
135. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, MD. L. REV. 655, 678–79 (2012)
(describing episode of sexual harassment in which online forum users “posted personal
information of their targets” and encouraged forum participants to contact victims directly);
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 53–54 (2016); see also David M.
Douglas, Doxing: A Conceptual Analysis, 18 ETHICS INFO. TECH. 199, 200 (2016) (“In cases
where exposing wrongdoing is in the public interest, deanonymizing and delegitimizing doxing
is permissible only to the extent necessary to reveal that wrongdoing has occurred.”).
136. Craig Timberg, Drew Harwell & Spencer S. Hsu, Police Let Most Capitol Rioters Walk
Away. But Cellphone Data and Videos Could Now Lead to More Arrests., WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/08/trump-mob-tech-arrests/
(“The countless hours of video—much of it taken by the rioters themselves and uploaded to
social media—also offers an ideal data set for facial recognition.”); Drew Harwell & Craig
Timberg, How America’s Surveillance Networks Helped the FBI Catch the Capitol Mob, WASH. POST
(Apr. 2, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/02/capitol-siegearrests-technology-fbi-privacy/.
137. Knibbs, supra note 12 (describing how efforts to preserve online documentation of
the Capitol putsch related to FBI’s efforts to seek evidence for use in criminal proceedings);
How Facebook is Responding to the Violence at the US Capitol, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2021, 1:00 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/facebooks-actions-in-response-to-washingtondc-violence (describing Facebook’s actions to remove content that “incites, praises, or
encourages violence or harm,” including support for the Capitol putsch).
138. About Nextdoor, https://about.nextdoor.com/ (last visited June 21, 2021).
139. Rahim Kurwa, Building the Digitally Gated Community: The Case of Nextdoor, 17
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 111, 113 (2019) (describing the “co-production of community
through participation in surveillance”).
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residents. 140 In response to criticism that its platform was amplifying patterns
of racial profiling and harassment, Nextdoor adopted changes to its service to
discourage users from posting unsubstantiated, racialized accusations. 141 In
2020, during nationwide uprisings against police violence, Nextdoor
announced that it was removing its “Forward to Police” feature, which
permitted users to forward posts directly to law enforcement partners. 142
Although Nextdoor has tried to nudge users away from using crime reporting
to perpetuate racial harassment, crime prevention is still a core part of
Nextdoor’s offerings and appeal. 143
4. Resistance Through Design
While this Article focuses on how platforms can enable and facilitate law
enforcement surveillance, in recent years, firms have also made design choices
that can obstruct policing, generating substantial legal and political backlash.
Although these choices can take many forms, I highlight two here.
First, firms can choose to collect and store data about user
communications in ways that are more or less vulnerable to law enforcement
demands. 144 For example, Signal, a secure messaging provider, simply “does
140. Sam Levin, Racial Profiling via Nextdoor.Com, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://eastbayexpress.com/racial-profiling-via-nextdoorcom-2-1/.
141. Sam Levin, What Happens when Tech Firms End Up at the Center of Racism Scandals?, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/30/techcompanies-racial-discrimination-nextdoor-airbnb (describing Nextdoor’s adoption of a new
system that warns users about racial profiling before they post a crime and safety message); see
also Tatyana Mamut, Announcing Our New Feature to Promote Kindness in Neighborhoods,
NEXTDOOR: BLOG (Sept. 18, 2019), https://blog.nextdoor.com/2019/09/18/announcingour-new-feature-to-promote-kindness-in-neighborhoods/ (describing Nextdoor’s “Kindness
Reminder” feature, which nudges users to reconsider offensive or hurtful posts before
publishing); Team Nextdoor, Standing in Solidarity with Black Neighbors—Nextdoor, (Mar. 25,
2021),
https://blog.nextdoor.com/2021/03/25/standing-in-solidarity-with-blackneighbors/ (prohibiting All Lives Matter and Blue Lives Matter content “when used to
undermine racial equality or the Black Lives Matter movement”).
142. Team Nextdoor, Nextdoor Removes “Forward to Police” Feature, NEXTDOOR: BLOG (June
18, 2020), https://blog.nextdoor.com/2020/06/18/nextdoor-removes-forward-to-policefeature/.
143. Joseph Porcelli, Nextdoor for Public Agencies Crime Prevention Engagement Plan, MEDIUM
(May 22, 2019), https://medium.com/nextdooragencyresources/nextdoor-for-publicagencies-crime-prevention-engagement-plan-1bf92c34b360; see, e.g., Timothy Hayden,
Arlington Policy Department, Requesting Assistance in Identifying Suspect that Broke into Vehicles in
Your Neighborhood., (Apr. 19, 2021), https://nextdoor.com/agency-post/tx/arlington/
arlington-police-department/requesting-assistance-in-identifying-suspect-that-broke-intovehicles-in-your-neighborhood-184037858/.
144. SHOSHANNA ZUBOFF, SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 385 (2019) (describing how
government officials “must work, at least in part, through the [private] surveillance capitalists”
to access and make use of consumer data).
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not collect user metadata,” the kind of to- and from- information that
accompanies a text message or phone call. 145 In contrast, ordinary telephone
and online service providers collect and store this information for months, if
not years. 146 The divergence between these two poles has, not surprisingly,
fostered legal controversy. For example, traceability obligations introduced in
India in 2021 would require platforms to be able to identify individuals who
“originate information” online and would appear to require firms like Signal
to redesign their services or to exit the market entirely. 147 Firms also choose
where to store user data. This has led some states to require that multinational
firms ensure that data about domestic users is stored domestically, in part so it
is readily available to law enforcement. 148
Second, firms can choose to implement encryption for communications
that are in storage or in transit. In October 2014, then-FBI Director James B.
Comey spoke at the Brookings Institution about the threat that important
sources of evidence and intelligence were rapidly “going dark.” 149 As major
communications providers increasingly adopted end-to-end encryption, he
argued, “the bad guys” could communicate without being intercepted by law
enforcement. 150 In the ensuing years, major communications platforms have
further committed to embracing end-to-end encryption. 151
145. Anna Wiener, Taking Back Our Privacy, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2020), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/10/26/taking-back-our-privacy.
146. Suzanne Choney, How Long Do Wireless Carriers Keep Your Data?, NBC NEWS (Sept.
29, 2011), https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/how-long-do-wireless-carriers-keep-yourdata-120367; Lily Hay Newman, How to Limit How Long Google Keeps Your Data, WIRED (May
7, 2019, 6:02 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/google-auto-delete-data-privacy-setting/
(“By default, Google will continue to indefinitely retain the Web & Activity data you’ve set it
to collect—everything by default.”).
147. Times Now Digital, WhatsApp Sues Centre Over New Social Media Rules: Why Facebookowned Company has Claimed they Endanger Privacy, TIMES NOW NEWS (May 26, 2021, 17:23 IST),
https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/whatsapp-sues-centre-over-new-socialmedia-rules-why-facebook-owned-company-has-claimed-they-endanger-privacy/762133.
148. Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 708–13 (2015)
(summarizing data localization mandates).
149. James B. Comey, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision
Course?, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course.
150. Id.
151. Cory Doctorow, Google Announces End-to-End Encryption for Gmail (a Big Deal!), BOING
BOING (June 4, 2014, 6:00 PM), https://boingboing.net/2014/06/04/google-announcesend-to-end-en.html; Aatif Sulleyman, This is why the Government is so Worried about WhatsApp
Encryption, THE INDEPENDENT (Mar. 27, 2017, 16:45), https://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/features/whatsapp-encryption-what-it-how-does-it-work-why-ban-itbackdoor-access-secret-messages-a7652396.html; Mark Zuckerberg, A Privacy-Focused Vision
for Social Networking, https://m.facebook.com/nt/screen/?params=%7B"note_id"%
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Encryption has become a major point of contention for law enforcement
in the United States and elsewhere. Domestically, for example, the San
Bernardino shootings generated legal controversy when Apple refused to
unlock the shooter’s iPhone. 152 In 2020, several Republican senators
introduced the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data (LAED) Act, which “would
bring an end to warrant-proof encryption in devices, platforms, and
systems.” 153 The LAED Act would “require device manufacturers and service
providers to assist law enforcement with accessing encrypted data if assistance
would aid in the execution of the warrant.” 154 Similar approaches have been
adopted elsewhere. In the United Kingdom, the Investigatory Powers Act
permits the government to issue a “technical capability notice” that requires
firms to be able to assist in executing lawful warrants. 155
As outlined above, technological design choices like these have prompted
substantial controversy and strife between regulators and platforms. Both
encryption and data storage choices can make it more difficult for platforms
or law enforcement to access information about user speech that is either
harmful or unlawful. 156 However, some automated mechanisms for screening
3A2420600258234172%7D&path=%2Fnotes%2Fnote%2F&refsrc=http%3A%2F%2Ft.co
%2F&_rdr (last visited June 22, 2021) (announcing plans to work on end-to-end encryption);
but see Andy Greenberg, Facebook Says Encrypting Messenger by Default Will Take Years, WIRED
(Jan. 10, 2020, 4:54 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-messenger-end-to-endencryption-default/.
152. Ellen Nakashima & Reed Albergotti, The FBI Wanted to Unlock the San Bernardino
Shooter’s IPhone. It Turned to a Little-Known Australian Firm., WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/14/azimuth-san-bernardino-apple-iphonefbi/.
153. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Graham, Cotton, Blackburn Introduce
Balanced Solution to Bolster National Security, End Use of Warrant-Proof Encryption that Shields Criminal
Activity,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/graham-cotton-blackburnintroduce-balanced-solution-to-bolster-national-security-end-use-of-warrant-proofencryption-that-shields-criminal-activity (last visited Dec. 29, 2021).
154. Id. The EARN IT Act proposed in 2020 adopted a similar approach, requiring
platforms to qualify for a statutory safe harbor under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act by showing that they abided by “best practices” to fight child sexual exploitation.
As several commentators noted, those “best practices” were likely incompatible with strong
encryption.; Lily Hay Newman, The EARN IT Act is a Sneak Attack on Encryption, WIRED (Mar.
5, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/earn-it-act-sneak-attack-on-encryption/;
Riana Pfefferkorn, The EARN IT ACT is a disaster amid the COVID-19 crisis, BROOKINGS INST.
(May 4 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/the-earn-it-act-is-a-disaster-amid-thecovid-19-crisis/.
155. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 § 253.
156. Michael H. Keller & Gabriel J. X. Dance, The Internet is Overrun with Images of Child
Sexual Abuse. What Went Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/09/28/us/child-sex-abuse.html (“[W]hen tech companies cooperate fully,
encryption and anonymization can create digital hiding places for perpetrators.”).

BLOCH-WEHBA_FINALFORMAT_01-21-22 (DO NOT DELETE)

9/15/2022 11:16 AM

1326

[Vol. 36:1297

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

content may be compatible with end-to-end encryption. 157 Whether firms
choose to deploy them is an entirely different design question.
B.

SHAPING LAW ENFORCEMENT THROUGH PLATFORM POLICY

Like technological design, firms’ internal policies also shape law
enforcement behavior by encouraging or discouraging certain kinds of
demands for different types of data. Partly because of the First Amendment
implications of compelled disclosure, social media platforms have sometimes
resisted government demands, citing the implications for their users. For
example, technology companies have, at times, moved to quash government
search warrants, attempting to advance the Fourth Amendment interests of
their users. 158 Electronic communications service providers have also invoked
their own expressive rights in efforts to lift nondisclosure orders that prevent
service providers from notifying users of demands for users’ information. 159
Outside of litigation, firms can also engage in private standard-setting to
raise the standard that the government must meet when it demands user
information. 160 Again, consider the example of government requests for
historical location information. As Matthew Tokson has observed, the
Supreme Court’s Carpenter decision is “exceedingly vague and cautious” with
regard to its application to new technologies and forms of surveillance. 161
Therefore, substantial ambiguity remains about whether government activity
constitutes a search or a seizure. 162

157. Jonathan Mayer, Content Moderation for End-to-End Encrypted Messaging, 5 (Oct. 6, 2019),
https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~jrmayer/papers/Content_Moderation_for_End-toEnd_Encrypted_Messaging.pdf.
158. See, e.g., In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 29 N.Y.3d 231 (2017).
159. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 908
(W.D. Wash. 2017) (concluding that Microsoft had adequately supported its argument that
nondisclosure orders under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act violated its First
Amendment rights); In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting petitioner’s
First Amendment challenge to nondisclosure orders that accompanied National Security
Letters); Twitter, Inc. v. Barr, 445 F. Supp. 3d 295 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (rejecting Twitter’s First
Amendment challenge to the government’s prohibition on publishing certain types of data
regarding legal process the platform had received under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act).
160. Cf. Klonick, supra note 5, at 1615 (developing the idea of private governance in the
context of platform content moderation standards).
161. Matthew Tokson, The Next Wave of Fourth Amendment Challenges after Carpenter, 59
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (2020).
162. Id.; see also United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 391–92 (7th Cir. 2021)
(concluding that real-time collection of location information for several hours was not a
“search” in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
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In the wake of Carpenter, does the government’s demand for location
information from Google raise a Fourth Amendment issue? At times, private
platform policymaking can preempt this inquiry. In one case, police
investigating a string of fires sought information from Google regarding user
devices near six different locations. 163 Although the government has argued
that Carpenter does not extend to reverse location information, in practice,
Google will only provide this information in response to a search warrant. 164
That creates a default practice in which the government must satisfy a higher
modicum of suspicion to satisfy Google’s policy notwithstanding the absence
of controlling legal precedent.
Firms also use the mechanisms of private governance—particularly
policies and terms of service—to limit government access to data in other
ways. In 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) obtained
information, through public records requests, showing that law enforcement
agencies were procuring social media monitoring software from third-party
vendors. In response, major social media firms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram publicly announced that they would cut off access to their
application programming interfaces (APIs) by firms that sold surveillance
software to law enforcement. 165
Yet it appears that these policy-based limitations on government access are
often ineffective. During the nationwide uprisings against police violence after
George Floyd’s murder in 2020, for example, it became clear that law
enforcement agencies were continuing to use social media monitoring services
such as Dataminr to keep tabs on protest, activism, and dissent. 166 In order to
circumvent Twitter’s terms of service, which barred API users from “tracking,
alerting, or monitoring sensitive events,” Dataminr has rebranded itself as a
breaking news service that takes advantage of access to Twitter’s “firehose” to
provide alerts to law enforcement clients. 167 The upshot is that while platform
firms’ formal content and privacy policies appear to bar use of their services
163. In re Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 351.
164. See In re Search of Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d
730, 736 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (finding that, because the government had sought a search warrant,
it had “forfeited the argument” that the Fourth Amendment didn’t apply); see also id. In re
Search Warrant Application for Geofence Location, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (noting that
Google “will only produce the information upon presentation of a warrant”).
165. Levinson-Waldman, Government Access, supra note 116, at 556–57.
166. Biddle, supra note 11; see also Lee Fang, FBI Expands Ability to Collect Cellphone Location
Data, Monitor Social Media, Recent Contracts Show, THE INTERCEPT (June 24, 2020, 8:56 PM),
.https://theintercept.com/2020/06/24/fbi-surveillance-social-media-cellphone-dataminrvenntel/; Sahar F. Aziz & Khaled A. Beydoun, Fear of a Black and Brown Internet: Policing Online
Activism, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1151, 116869 (2020).
167. Biddle, supra note 11.
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for law enforcement surveillance, a veritable cottage industry of surveillance
and monitoring firms has sprung up to help police take full advantage of the
wealth of intelligence that social media can provide.
C.

VOLUNTARY PRIVATE-PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE ARRANGEMENTS

It is not just that private governance sometimes serves as an ineffective
check on law enforcement; at times, private decision-making can in fact
advance law enforcement goals. Indeed, voluntary private decision-making can
give rise to a systematic relationship with law enforcement investigations,
arrests, and prosecutions. Faced with competing pressures to both take down
more harmful content and to facilitate law enforcement surveillance, the
private sector has increasingly turned to voluntary, cross-platform
arrangements that allow them to pool technical and policy resources across
firms. 168
Collaboration to eradicate child sexual abuse imagery provides one
illustration. While technology firms are not required to proactively monitor
user-uploaded or -generated content for unlawful child sexual abuse imagery,
many do so voluntarily. 169 For example, Microsoft’s PhotoDNA program, a
hash-matching tool, scans images and videos against a database of unlawful
images. 170 Thorn, a nonprofit organization, has developed a technical tool for
the same purposes for smaller companies to use. 171 When a firm detects a
match, federal law requires the firm to report it to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). 172 NCMEC, in turn, discloses the
information to law enforcement and plays an essential coordinating role with
law enforcement agencies investigating the crime. 173 While NCMEC itself is a
private organization, it is funded through annual grants by the government
and, pursuant to federal law, must coordinate several distinct public and
private programs. 174 At least one federal court has concluded that NCMEC’s

168. EVELYN DOUEK, THE RISE OF CONTENT CARTELS 5–6 (Knight First Amendment
Inst. Colum. Univ., 2020) (describing voluntary cross-industry arrangements as “content
cartels”).
169. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 10, at 58.
170. Id. at 58.
171. Olivia Solon, To Fight Online Child Sexual Abuse, Tech Companies Turn to a Nonprofit
Startup, NBC NEWS (July 22, 2020, 3:16 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/
fight-online-child-sexual-abuse-tech-companies-turn-nonprofit-startup-n1234569.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
173. United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 2016).
174. 34 U.S.C. § 11293(b).
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statutory obligations give rise to “special law enforcement duties and powers”
that distinguish it from other private entities. 175
Platforms also collaborate on efforts to filter and block terrorist content
online. Consider the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT),
a private, voluntary consortium of technology firms that uses both hash-based
and artificial intelligence-based filtering to detect unlawful terrorist content
across platforms. 176 The GIFCT’s database is limited to industry members and
is not shared directly with law enforcement. 177 But new European regulations
will require platforms to take proactive measures to remove terrorist content
and to preserve it for law enforcement purposes for six months. 178 The result
is that the GIFCT hash-matching database is likely to yield a substantial
number of posts that platforms will be required to preserve for potential law
enforcement use and possibly to report to the “competent authorities.” 179
These two examples illustrate a strikingly similar dynamic: technology
firms have voluntarily adopted monitoring technology to enforce contentrelated rules, the use of which gives rise to an escalating set of legal obligations.
In the context of child sexual abuse imagery, platforms must report
information to NCMEC, a nominally private center, which then funnels it to
law enforcement. 180 In the context of terrorist imagery, platforms are required
to report certain kinds of terroristic threats to European authorities and
likewise required to preserve a broader range of information for future law
enforcement use. 181 The result is that the monitoring technology used to detect
175. See Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1296–97. A second court has concluded that NCMEC can
act as part of the “prosecution team” for purposes of discovery, and of obligations to disclose
exculpatory evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland.; United States v. Rosenschein, CR 164571 JCH, 2019 WL 2298810, at *7 (D.N.M. May 30, 2019), clarified on denial of
reconsideration, CR 16-4571 JCH, 2020 WL 2750247 (D.N.M. May 27, 2020) (“It was
NCMEC’s acts of investigating the location and providing CyberTipline information to the
geographically appropriate law enforcement agency that effectively commenced the
prosecution of this case.”).
176. Explainers, GLOBAL INTERNET F. COUNTER TERRORISM,https://gifct.org/
explainers/ (last visited June 21, 2021); Robert Gorwa, Reuben Binns & Christian Katzenbach,
Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform
Governance: 7 BIG DATA & SOCIETY 1 (2020) (describing GIFCT’s use of hash-based and
machine learning techniques).
177. GLOB. INTERNET F. COUNTER TERRORISM, supra note 176.
178. Regulation 2021/784 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 29,
2021, On Addressing The Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online (“TERREG”), art. 6
sec. 3, art. 3.
179. Id. art. 6(1)–(2) (requiring hosting service providers to “preserve terrorist content”
for six months); art. 14(5).
180. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1296–97.
181. TERREG arts. 6 and 14.
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lawbreaking itself lies at the heart of investigations and prosecutions, yielding
increasing entanglements between law enforcement and platform
governance. 182
The increased reliance on automated content moderation also creates new
opportunities and frameworks within which platforms share user
communications with law enforcement. Ordinarily, the Stored
Communications Act (SCA) bars electronic communications service providers
from voluntarily disclosing user communications to law enforcement, with a
few exceptions. 183 Broadly speaking, the SCA is meant to limit the
circumstances in which user communications are shared with law enforcement
to those circumstances in which the government has met the appropriate
standard. 184 But if the communications service provider obtains the contents
of communications “inadvertently” and they “appear to pertain to the
commission of a crime,” then the provider may disclose the contents to a law
enforcement agency. 185
Firms that detect legal violations using technical moderation tools are
arguably free to voluntarily disclose that information to law enforcement
pursuant to the SCA because they learned of it “inadvertently” and the
contents “appear to pertain to the commission of a crime.” 186 Alternatively,
law enforcement could use a search warrant, administrative subpoena, or
2703(d) order to compel a platform to disclose subscriber information for any
user who has uploaded content that has been flagged as unlawful. 187 Law
enforcement has pursued this dragnet approach before. In 2017, the
government obtained a search warrant to compel DisruptJ20, a website that
had been used to organize protests against Donald Trump’s inauguration, to
disclose records related to a huge number of people who had visited the site. 188
It is well within the realm of possibility that law enforcement may use a similar
process to seek information about individuals who have been flagged through
182. See, e.g., State v. Lizotte, 197 A.3d 362, 366 (Vt. 2018) (describing AOL’s use of its
“Image Detection Filtering Process” in the context of a defense motion to suppress).
183. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
184. See 18 U.S.C § 2701(a)–(c) (making it a criminal offense to access stored
communications, except if doing so is authorized); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)–(c) (setting forth
procedural requirements that law enforcement must meet in order to access different types of
communications information).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7)(A).
186. Id.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
188. Coalition: Justice Department’s demand for protest website data raises privacy and
civil liberty concerns, OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG (Aug. 24, 2017), https://
www.openthegovernment.org/coalition-justice-departments-demand-for-protest-websitedata-raises-privacy-and-civil-liberty-concerns/.
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the GIFCT database or who have been suspended for posting terrorist-related
content.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

As Reidenberg rightly anticipated, today’s public sphere is shaped as much
by private technological and design choices as by formal law and regulation. 189
But the emergence of private platforms as regulatory forces in their own right
has not uniformly diminished the role or power of the state. Certainly,
platform intransigence on content-related issues has, at times, posed challenges
for law enforcement. 190 But platforms can also expand and facilitate law
enforcement power by encoding and enforcing law enforcement demands in
the rules, norms, and technological infrastructures of online governance.
The current alignment between private technology firms and public law
enforcement has expanded the authority and the power of both firms and
states. At the same time, as governments seek to incentivize technology firms
to prevent the dissemination of unlawful speech through private governance
and technology, they also enlist technology firms to aid in digital surveillance,
both directly and indirectly. 191 As outlined in Parts II and III, these efforts can
sometimes occur at cross-purposes; increasing deletion of online content has,
at times, created obstacles for law enforcement investigating criminal activity
online. But here, too, technology itself can provide a workaround. New
surveillance technology tools and practices emerge, taking advantage of the
affordances of social media for law enforcement’s gain.
A.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW FORMS OF DISCLOSURE

New legal and technological developments only underscore the mutual
dependency between private firms and the public sector. As both governments
and tech firms herald the growing capacity and use of artificial intelligence and
automated content moderation systems, content- and data-related decisionmaking itself is increasingly becoming entwined with law enforcement
objectives. Yet the more extensive public-private cooperation becomes, the
weaker the opportunities for accountability appear.
189. Reidenberg, supra note 16, at 571 (“The political-governance process ordinarily
establishes the substantive law of the land. For Lex Informatica, however, the primary source
of default rule-making is the technology developer and the social process by which customary
uses evolve.”).
190. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem isn’t Just Backpage:
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 466 (2018) (listing myriad bad actors
who were protected from legal liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act).
191. Balkin, supra note 74, at 2019–20.
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Emerging forms of content and data governance generate new demands
by law enforcement for consumer data. 192 Again, the example of the Internet
of Things is illustrative: why conduct a search of a person’s home in real time
when a set of networked home technologies makes it possible to do so
retrospectively? As online platforms turn increasingly toward automated
moderation techniques to proactively filter user-generated content, the content
moderation process itself becomes an increasingly appealing target for law
enforcement. Platforms engaged in automated content moderation will obtain
access to a huge amount of content that either violates or appears to violate
the law. Indeed, the explicit goal of automated moderation is to scale
enforcement of platform rules and practices to respond to the growing volume
of online content. 193 But because the technology is not yet that sophisticated,
automated techniques are often necessarily over inclusive. 194 This means that,
at times, automated moderation will sweep in more content than it was
intended to.
In the United States, the examples of NCMEC and Thorn already illustrate
how voluntary content moderation processes can feed law enforcement
demands. 195 But existing laws governing the sharing of data between private
and public sector actors are ill-equipped to address these emerging practices.
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) presumptively limits the sharing of
private user information between communications firms and law enforcement
to a defined set of circumstances governed by appropriate statutory limitations.
For example, the SCA explicitly provides that platforms may voluntarily
disclose user data to NCMEC in connection with a statutorily required report
regarding child sexual abuse imagery. 196 As tech firms engage in more extensive
collaboration, including with nonprofits and independent organizations such
as Thorn and GIFCT, neither the SCA nor the Fourth Amendment are likely
to promote private accountability. For its part, the SCA’s voluntary disclosure
limitations extend only to actors who provide a “remote computing service”
or “electronic communication service” to the public, which coalitions such as
Thorn and GIFCT do not. 197 Moreover, the SCA explicitly permits platforms
to share data among themselves without constraint. 198 The lax attitude toward
private data sharing will encourage more voluntary, private arrangements to
192. See infra Part III.
193. Gorwa et al., supra note 176, at 2.
194. Gorwa et al., supra note 176, at 5 (describing how machine learning systems “risk
over-blocking in cases in which the word may be acceptable in context”).
195. See Ohm, supra note 113.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(5).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).
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emerge, while ignoring how those arrangements feed law enforcement
demands for data. 199
Outside the United States, new statutory initiatives already make clear that
law enforcement has a growing appetite to deputize the content moderation
process in service of investigative needs. In Germany, legislators introduced a
new version of the Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG) alongside a package
of measures intended to strengthen criminal law enforcement. 200 The new
initiatives would require social network providers to report content that
violated certain criminal prohibitions directly to law enforcement, along with
the user’s IP address and passwords. 201 As platforms continue to ramp up their
efforts to police harmful and unlawful content through technology and
through policy, the data they collect will, itself, become a rich source of
evidence for law enforcement.
B.

NEW INVESTIGATIVE METHODS

Firms’ private decisions regarding both design and policy do not only
shape law enforcement practices. They also shape the law of criminal
procedure itself.
First, the design of technical infrastructure that facilitates the simultaneous
collection and retention of information from large numbers of users
encourages a shift from individualized suspicion to larger scale “dragnets,”
often with unclear consequences for Fourth Amendment protections. 202 For
199. Cf. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Transparency after Carpenter, 59 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 28
(2020) (“[P]rivate sector data collection has created a rich source of information for law
enforcement, yet goes hand in hand with stringent limitations on government conduct.”).
200. Evelyn Douek, Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and Fake News Takes
Effect, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2017, 11:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ germanys-boldgambit-prevent-online-hate-crimes-and-fake-news-takes-effect; Amelie Heldt, Germany is
Amending its Online Speech Act NetzDG. . .But Not Only That, INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Apr. 6,
2020),
https://policyreview.info/articles/news/germany-amending-its-online-speech-actnetzdg-not-only/1464.
201. Patrick Beuth, Was Sie über das Gesetz gegen Hasskriminalität Wissen Müssen, DER
SPIEGEL, (Feb. 18, 2020, 5:10 PM) https://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/gesetzgegen-hasskriminalitaet-was-sie-darueber-wissen-muessen-a-1f995e2b-80a9-4e11-aecc75f3250c69b9 (reporting that social network providers would be required to report certain
violent threats, neo-Nazi propaganda, and incitement of hatred along with the IP addresses
and port numbers of the subscribers to the German federal criminal police; in addition,
providers may also be required to share passwords with law enforcement or intelligence
agencies).
202. Renan, supra note 116, at 1053; Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining
what’s Reasonable: The Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 303–04 (2016)
(describing the turn toward “dragnet searches”); Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110 (2010) (defining “dragnets” as “programmatic government
efforts to investigate, detect, deter, or prevent crime or other significant harm by subjecting a
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example, information gleaned from generalized social media surveillance might
be included in law enforcement databases and in targeted investigations. Gang
policing is illustrative: Police frequently use social media information in gang
databases, which collect and maintain information about alleged gang
members. 203 Posts in which a user “admits” to gang membership, photos that
include gang signs or other alleged gang members, and “liking” other users’
gang related posts are all reportedly sufficient to land a social media user in a
gang database. 204 Data from social media also makes its way into predictive
policing tools, immigration enforcement, and domestic terrorism
investigations. 205
Law enforcement often describes the scraping, analysis, and use of huge
amounts of publicly available data to predict and control behavior as an
essential tool for high-priority investigations. 206 But perhaps this is exactly
backwards—perhaps it is the availability of the data itself, and the possibilities
for analysis and interpretation, that drive law enforcement’s turn toward new
priorities. 207 And, of course, it is not just the ease of acquiring privately held
data that incentivizes law enforcement to adopt new data-driven techniques,

group of people, most of whom are concededly innocent of wrongdoing or of plans to engage
in it, to a deprivation of liberty or other significant intrusion.”).
203. Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Visible Policing: Technology, Transparency, and Democratic Control,
109 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 950–54 (2021).
204. Sara Robinson, When a Facebook Like Lands You in Jail, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July
6, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/when-facebook-landsyou-jail; STUART, supra note 39, at 9; Meredith Broussard, When Cops Check Facebook, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/whencops-check-facebook/390882/.
205. Drew Harwell & Nick Miroff, ICE Just Abandoned its Dream of “Extreme Vetting”
Software that Could Predict whether a Foreign Visitor would become a Terrorist, WASH. POST (May 17,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/17/ice-justabandoned-its-dream-of-extreme-vetting-software-that-could-predict-whether-a-foreignvisitor-would-become-a-terrorist/; Will Carless, Feds are Tracking Americans’ Social Media to
Identify Dangerous Conspiracies. Critics Worry for Civil Liberties., USA TODAY (2021), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/14/terrorist-social-media-narrativesfocus-new-dhs-effort/5075237001/.
206. See, e.g., Wes Simmons, Big Data Does Not Have to Mean Big Brother or be a Big Deal,
POLICE CHIEF MAGAZINE (May 3, 2017), https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/big-datadoes-not-have-to-mean-big-brother/ (recounting hypothetical case of an illegally armed
individual identified and prevented from committing a violent act because of big data); see also
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327,
362–63 (2015) (describing how “law enforcement and private companies have embraced the
idea of networking and sharing personal information”).
207. Cf. Fourcade & Gordon, supra note 99, at 79–80 (describing how technology
generates “new possibilities,” often controlled and marketed to government by private firms).
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but also the emergence of privately developed networked technologies that are
themselves purpose-built for law enforcement uses. 208
Second, the essential role of networked technology firms in facilitating
surveillance also limits opportunities for oversight agencies, the public, and
defendants to understand how law enforcement is doing its job. Once upon a
time, the search of a home was the “canonical fact pattern” of Fourth
Amendment law. 209 But today, rather than conducting a physical search of
one’s home, law enforcement can issue a remote request to a Silicon Valley
firm to compel disclosure of reams of intimate data from inside the same four
walls. 210 As Jon Michaels has pointed out with regard to intelligence, publicprivate cooperation can enhance secrecy and impede oversight. 211 The web of
sealing and secrecy orders that often surrounds electronic surveillance tends to
obscure the role that social media platforms play in facilitating law
enforcement investigations. 212 In prior work, I have also suggested that the
emergence of more secretive forms of surveillance has diminished the
opportunities for defendants to use the law of criminal procedure to hold law
enforcement accountable. 213
In theory, networked technology firms should reduce, rather than increase,
secrecy. As David Pozen has put it, a secret is “deep” if its existence is
concealed from the public; a secret is “shallow” if “ordinary citizens
understand they are being denied relevant information and have some ability
to estimate its content.” 214 Private firms, which exist outside the executive
branch, are arguably able to increase and facilitate public knowledge of
surveillance practices. 215
208. Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and
Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 15, 15 (2016) (“New technologies have altered surveillance
discretion by lowering its costs and increasing the capabilities of the police to identify
suspicious persons.”); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of Blue Data,
72 VAND. L. REV. 561, 597 (2019).
209. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536
(2005).
210. Ohm, supra note 113, at 395–96 (arguing that Carpenter requires law enforcement to
get a warrant before obtaining smart home data from third-party technology providers).
211. See Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the
War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 922–26 (2008) (describing how informal public-private
partnerships can minimize leaks, negative publicity, and legal risk).
212. Smith, supra note 107, at 602; Manes, supra note 15, at 351.
213. Bloch-Wehba, supra note 122, at 14 (“Diminished Fourth Amendment protections
have also made it much more difficult for courts, defendants, and the public to get critical
information necessary to check the police.”).
214. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 274 (2009–10).
215. Manes, supra note 15, at 344 (“If these companies could win the right to speak about
the kinds of records the government is ordering them to disclose, they would be able to provide
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Yet the increasing role of private sector actors in policing has not
appreciably diminished law enforcement secrecy, but rather shifted the locus
of claims of secrecy to private sector actors. Today, technology companies
routinely invoke trade secrecy and other corporate protections to avoid
transparency about the role they play in facilitating law enforcement
investigations and prosecutions. 216 In an atmosphere of increased calls to
defund and reform policing, secrecy plays an essential role in protecting law
enforcement’s private partners from reputational risk. 217 By shielding private
firms from the reputational costs of partnering with police, however, law
enforcement also reduces the public’s ability to monitor and understand how
the government conducts surveillance.
Third, technology firms are unconstrained by constitutional limitations.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, constitutional constraints on searches and
seizures are limited to “unreasonable searches undertaken by the government
or its agents—not private parties.” 218 As Kiel Brennan-Marquez has
documented, the traditional approach has been to examine whether a private
party was “deputized” by the state to investigate; if so, the party loses its
“private” status, and the Fourth Amendment applies to the search. 219 BrennanMarquez points out, however, that courts have uniformly held that voluntary
private hashing such as that accomplished by PhotoDNA software or the
GIFCT is not covered by the Fourth Amendment. 220 This creates a legal gap,
inviting law enforcement to exploit private action and informal relationships
to extend its own power. In contrast, Brennan-Marquez suggests that, where
the government relies on private action to extend the infrastructure of
surveillance, the Constitution ought to follow. 221
Here, regulatory action and jawboning have created new incentives for
platforms to engage in private policing that itself drives law enforcement
the public with crucial information about how the surveillance laws have been interpreted and
applied in practice.”).
216. See generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018); see also Sonia K. Katyal, Private
Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 87 (2019) (describing how
Northpointe, a firm that provides risk assessment tools used at sentencing, conceals the weight
of its risk scores based on trade secrecy); Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 659, 668–71 (2018) (describing how, pursuant to non-disclosure agreements with
Harris Corp., police concealed the use of Stingray technology).
217. Michaels, supra note 211, at 926 (arguing that “handshake collaborations” with
government agencies may generate litigation risk for firms).
218. Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1295.
219. Brennan-Marquez, supra note 17, at 488.
220. Id. at 504.
221. Id. at 505.
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action. Yet Fourth Amendment protections have not followed. Voluntary
private searches for unlawful content trigger no Fourth Amendment
protection. Neither, seemingly, does the use of new technologies of
surveillance that reimagine online speech as a source of law enforcement
intelligence. 222 Indeed, the lack of constitutional constraints likely encourages
informal relationships between tech firms and law enforcement by avoiding
the heavy costs of the warrant requirement, reasonableness limitations, and the
exclusionary rule. 223 As Brennan-Marquez suggests, these circumstances may
warrant a reimagining of the constitutional status of purportedly “private”
searches. 224
To be clear, I do not suggest that any time a platform takes action on
content in a manner favored by the government, the Constitution ought to
attach. Technology firms are powerful, wealthy actors; the fact that their
interests sometimes (or even often) align with the government’s is hardly
surprising, nor is it cause for inherent suspicion. But the extensive alignment
between platforms and states ought to prompt scholars and policymakers to
reexamine the prevalent assumption that technology firms are engaged in
forms of private governance accountable to nobody except, possibly, their
shareholders. The truth is that, while platforms can provide a powerful
counterweight to state action, they can just as easily buttress it.
C.

DESIGN AND LEGAL IMMUNITY

Another way in which the government might limit private accountability
for partnering with law enforcement is through granting immunity from suit
for firms. The government might simply decide to require technology firms to
design their services and products in ways that are more amenable to law
enforcement. For example, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA) requires telecommunications carriers to design
their services to be capable of providing access for law enforcement. 225 As Gus
222. See Jeramie D. Scott, Social Media and Government Surveillance: The Case for Better Privacy
Protections for Our Newest Public Space, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 151, 158–59 (2017) (explaining that
Fourth Amendment does not protect social media posts “knowingly expose[d]” to the public
eye); cf. Ken Dilanian, DHS Launches Warning System to Find Domestic Terrorism Threats on Public
Social Media, NBC NEWS (May 10, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
national-security/dhs-launches-warning-system-find-domestic-terrorism-threats-publicsocial-n1266707 (describing a Department of Homeland Security proposal to use social media
to detect domestic terrorism threats).
223. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1265, 1274–77 (1999) (observing that Fourth Amendment law makes certain investigative
activities more “costly” than others).
224. Brennan-Marquez, supra note 17, at 489.
225. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a).
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Hurwitz has pointed out, CALEA was “arguably the first time that Congress
had imposed affirmative design requirements on firms in order to support law
enforcement capabilities.” 226 Outside the United States, regulators are already
pressuring platforms to redesign their moderation techniques and rules to
prioritize law enforcement, as the NetzDG and the EU Terrorist Regulation
both demonstrate. As outlined above, a growing chorus of proposals would
also require platforms to retain and disclose user data for law enforcement as
well.
Congress may also grant statutory immunity to firms that partner with law
enforcement. Consider the response after the New York Times published a
story in 2005 detailing how telecommunications companies had partnered
willingly with federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies after
September 11th to collect the contents of communications under what was
known inside the Bush Administration as the “Terrorist Surveillance
Program,” which became colloquially known as “warrantless wiretapping.” 227
In the following months and years, dozens of lawsuits were filed against the
telecommunications companies themselves, as well as the National Security
Agency (NSA). 228 In response, Congress enacted the Federal Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (“FISA Amendments
Act”), which codified provisions authorizing the bulk collection of some
foreign communications. 229 The FISA Amendments Act also granted
conditional statutory immunity to private firms that worked with the Terrorist
Surveillance Program under assurances that the program was lawful. 230 News
organizations have also reported that telecommunications firms have assisted
law enforcement with wiretapping in legally dubious circumstances after

226. Justin Hurwitz, Encryption^Congress Mod(Apple + CALEA), 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
355, 379 (2017).
227. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N. Y. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-oncallers-without-courts.html.
228. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Rec. Litig., 671 F.3d 881, 890 (2011)
(analyzing statutory immunity for telecommunications companies that collaborated with NSA
warrantless wiretapping); Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 673 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2011)
(permitting AT&T subscriber to proceed in First and Fourth Amendment challenge to
warrantless wiretapping that AT&T conducted “in collaboration with the [NSA]”) ; American
Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that plaintiffs
lacked standing for First and Fourth Amendment claims against the NSA regarding the
Terrorist Surveillance Program).
229. Pub. L. No. 110-261.
230. 50 U.S.C. § 1885a(4)(A); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Rec. Litig., 633 F. Supp.
2d 949, 959 (2009) (describing the FISA Amendments Act immunity provision as “sui generis”
because of its limitations on subject-matter, time period, and those who could invoke it).
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having been granted immunity from prosecution in what are known as 2511
letters. 231
Finally, amid growing calls to rethink or repeal Section 230, immunity for
partnering with law enforcement may become more significant. While
platforms’ “right to exclude” user-generated content has increasingly been
called into question, the obligation to comply with law enforcement demands
remains at the core of many proposals to redesign Section 230. 232 If Congress
were to enact legislation that renders platforms immune from suit when they
take down “unlawful” content, they may also immunize platforms from
liability for their collaboration with law enforcement in determining whether
content is, in fact, unlawful.
V.

CONCLUSION

Amid broadening recognition that social media platforms aggravate offline
harms, like election tampering, communal violence, public health risks, and
genocide, platforms’ collaborations with law enforcement institutions bring
both positive and negative effects. Synergies between public policy and private
platform decision-making surely strengthen the government’s ability to put its
priorities into action. At the same time, however, the emergent ecosystem of
information-sharing, collaboration, and public-private cooperation
undermines the conventional wisdom that platform power necessarily comes
at the expense of state authority, and vice versa. Law enforcement exerts both
direct and indirect pressure on platform content rules, urging platforms to
adopt more restrictive community standards, facilitate speedier takedowns,
and share more information about harmful content with regulators. At the
same time, platforms’ affordances are reshaping law enforcement
investigations and advancing surveillance.
Instead, as Reidenberg recognized, lex informatica can advance the goals of
regulation as easily as inhibit them. The truth is that platforms in many
contexts reflect the values of governments and specifically reflect the need for
effective law enforcement. The same features that make social media so
231. Janus Kopfstein, AT&T Getting Secret Immunity from Wiretapping Laws for Government
Surveillance, THE VERGE (Apr. 24, 2013, 2:42 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/4/24/
4261410/att-getting-secret-wiretapping-immunity-government-surveillance.
232. Biden v. Knight Inst., 593 U.S. __, 8 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring); see Stop the
Censorship Act, H.R. 4027 (116th Cong.), Sec. 2 (eliminating platforms’ immunity for
moderating content that it deems objectionable but preserving immunity for taking down
“unlawful content”); Protecting Constitutional Rights from Online Platform Censorship Act,
H.R. 83 (117th Cong.), Sec. 2 (making it unlawful for platforms to moderate “protected”
content, and by implication excluding illicit material from the definition of “protected”).
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compelling as a technology of mass communication—the ability to
instantaneously reach a broad audience—make it equally compelling as a
technology of surveillance that is easy and cheap to use in both targeted and
dragnet investigative contexts.
Yet twenty-three years after Reidenberg’s germinal observations, U.S. law
has made little progress in ensuring that lex informatica is as democratically
legitimate or accountable as its regulatory equivalents. As technology firms
increasingly rely on automation and predictive technology to define the
boundaries between lawful and unlawful speech, the private policies and
techniques of platform governance are increasingly transmuted into public law
enforcement institutions. Despite the blurry boundaries between firm and
state, the laws of surveillance and information-sharing continue to recognize a
sharp divide between public and private actors. Amid growing calls to
fundamentally rethink, reshape, or abolish U.S. policing, we should reconsider
how the law enables private sector firms to act as a force multiplier for law
enforcement.

